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INTRODUCTON
In a recent article, Wendy E. Parmet and Daniel Jackson discuss
the promising search for an AIDS cure.' At the Vancouver AIDS Con-
ference in July of 1996, researchers unveiled the encouraging results
of tests performed with new antiviral drugs (protease inhibitors) that,
in test cases, reduced levels of the human immunodeficiency virus
I See Wendy E. Parmet & Daniel J. Jackson, No Longer Disabled: The Legal Impact of the
New Social Construction of HIV, 23 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 27-28 (1997).
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(HIV) in certain individuals to nearly undetectable levels.2 The an-
nouncement heralded improved prospects for the battle against the
HIV-AIDS epidemic, as suggested by an article in Newsweek magazine
that asked if these drugs might bring "[t]he [e]nd of AIDS."3 Parmet
and Jackson argue that the Vancouver announcement, viewed in con-
junction with other partially effective HIV drugs discovered in the
1980s and 1990s, like AZT, marked the turning point in a gradual
change from society's traditional construction of HIV as a "disabling
and terminal" plague4 to a perception of the disease as "chronic" and
potentially avoidable.5 Parmet and Jackson point out the dangerous
consequence of this softer construction of HIV: the protection of HIV-
infected individuals under American disability laws will be eroded as
the disease comes to be viewed as less of a society-endangering
plague.6 Indeed, these fears are already being realized in a line of
cases within the Fourth Circuit 7 that diverges from the traditionaljudi-
2 See id. (citing Lawrence K. Altman, AIDS Meeting: Sings of Hope and Obstacles, N.Y.
TIMES, July 7, 1996, at Al, and Nigel Hawkes, New Drugs Cut Level of HIV, THE TIsESJuly 8,
1996, Homes News Sec., at 6).
3 See id. (citing John Leland, The End ofAIDS?, NEvSWEEK, Dec. 2, 1996, at 64).
4 Parmet &Jackson, supra note 1, at 8.
5 Id. at 27-28.
6 See id. at 9. Of course, as these drugs come closer to a cure for HIV, the need for
protecting HIV-infected individuals via American disability laws would correspondingly de-
cline, and thus, the fear expressed by Parmet and Jackson would prove irrelevant. How-
ever, implicit in their discussion is the assumption that the slightest signs of promise from
these drugs will push HIV away from the plague end of the spectrum to the controllable-
disease end, before it really belongs there. See id. The consequence of such a premature
social construction of HIV is that disability protection wil be eroded before society can
really classify HIV as a manageable disease, leaving the HIV-infected community in a sort of
legal purgatory. See id. at 43.
In fact, a recent study suggests that there is reason to restrain our optimism about the
success of so-called drug "cocktails" in reducing HIV levels. Researchers at theJohns Hop-
ins University School of Medicine have discovered that the HIV virus can hide in immune-
system T-cells, lying dormant for up to 60 years until these cells are called upon to fight an
infection. See AIDS Virus Can Lurk for 60 Years, Study Finds (April 26, 1999) <http://
cnn.com/HEALTH/9904/26/aids.reservoir>.
7 See, e.g., Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Maryland, 123 F.3d 156, 172 (4th Cir. 1997)
(holding that an employee's asymptomatic HIV infection is not a disability under the
ADA); Ennis v. National Ass'n of Bus. & Educ. Radio, 53 F.3d 55, 60 (4th Cir. 1995) (hold-
ing that merely being infected with HIV is not per se a disability within the meaning of the
ADA.); Doe v. University of Maryland Med. Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d 1261, 1267 (4th Cir. 1995)
(holding that an HIV-infected resident in neurosurgery "pose[d] a significant risk to the
health or safety of... patients that cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodations,
and therefore [is] not otherwise qualified" within the meaning of the ADA). Several dis-
trict courts within the Fourth Circuit have reached similar conclusions. See, e.g., Cortes v.
McDonald's Corp., 955 F. Supp. 541,547 (E.D.N.C. 1996) (following the Fourth Circuit in
ruling that asymptomatic HIV is not a disability); EEOC v. Newport News Shipbuilding &
Drydock Co., 949 F. Supp. 403, 407 n.5 (E.D. Va. 1996) (acknowiedging Fourth Circuit
precedent that HIV-positive status is not a per se disability).
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cial consensus that HIV-infected individuals are "disabled" and thus
protected by the Americans with Disabilities Act of 19908 (ADA). 9
The Supreme Court undertook to resolve this split just over a
year ago in Bragdon v. Abbott.'0 Although the decision may allay the
fears of Parmet and Jackson, lingering doubts about the future of the
law remain. In Bragdon, the Court reaffirmed the majority view, hold-
ing that HIV infection is a "disability" under § 12102 of the ADA,"
even in the asymptomatic stage,' 2 because it is a physical impainnent
8 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994). Congress enacted the ADA to prohibit discrimi-
nation against individuals with disabilities and specifically to achieve the following goals:
(1) to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimina-
tion of discrimination against individuals with disabilities;
(2) to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing
discrimination against individuals with disabilities;
(3) to ensure that the Federal Government plays a central role in enforcing
the standards established in this chapter on behalf of individuals with disa-
bilities; and
(4) to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the power to
enforce the fourteenth amendment and to regulate commerce, in order to
address the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with
disabilities.
Id. § 12101(b).
9 See, e.g., Gates v. Rowland, 39 F.3d 1439, 1446 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding that "a per-
son infected with the HIV virus is an individual with a disability within the meaning of the
[ADA]"); Anderson v. Gus Mayer Boston Store, 924 F. Supp. 763, 774-75 (E.D. Tex. 1996)
(holding that HIV-infection is a per se disability); Doe v. Kohn Nast & Graf, P.C., 862 F.
Supp. 1310, 1321 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (holding that an attorney infected with HIV is disabled
under the ADA).
10 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
11 Section 12102 defines disability as "(A) a physical or mental impairment that sub-
stantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of
such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C.
§ 12102 (1994).
12 Clearly, any attempt to provide a comprehensive medical overview of HIV infection
and AIDS lies outside the scope of this Note. However, the majority opinion in Bragdon
provides an excellent overview of the three stages of HIV infection:
The initial stage of HIV infection is known as acute or primary HIV infec-
tion. In a typical case, this stage lasts three months. The virus concentrates
in the blood. The assault on the immune system is immediate. The victim
suffers from a sudden and serious decline in the number of white blood
cells. There is no latency period. Mononucleosis-like symptoms often
emerge between six days and six weeks after infection, at times accompa-
nied by fever, headache, enlargement of the lymph nodes (lymphade-
nopathy), muscle pain (myalgia), rash, lethargy, gastrointestinal disorders,
and neurological disorders. Usually these symptoms abate within 14 to 21
days. HIV antibodies appear in the bloodstream within 3 weeks; circulating
HIV can be detected within 10 weeks.
After the symptoms associated with the initial stage subside, the disease
enters what is referred to sometimes as its asymptomatic phase. The term is
a misnomer, in some respects, for clinical features persist throughout, in-
cluding lymphadenopathy, dermatological disorders, oral lesions, and bac-
terial infections. Although it varies with each individual, in most instances
this stage lasts from 7 to II years. The virus now tends to concentrate in the
lymph nodes, though low levels of the virus continue to appear in the blood
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IMPLICATIONS FOR HIV INFECTION
that substantially limits the "major life activity"' 3 of reproduction
through the risk of HIV transmission from mother to child "during
gestation and childbirth."' 4 Certainly, this inclusion of HIV infection
under the ADA definition of disability as an impairment of the major
life activity of reproduction is not without substantial support. For ex-
ample, prior to the ADA's passage, a report from the House Educa-
tion and Labor Committee noted that "a person infected with the
Human Immunodeficiency Virus is covered under the first prong of
the definition of the term 'disability' because of a substantial limita-
tion to procreation and intimate sexual relationships."15 But despite
the seeming clarity of this statement, the dissent in Bragdon argued
that reproduction is not a major life activity as contemplated by the
ADA, and thus should not form the basis for qualifying HIV infection
as a disability. 16 This position emulates opinions of the Fourth Cir-
cUlt' 7 and its followers,' 8 which hold that reproduction is not a major
life activity and that consequently, one should not consider HIV infec-
tion a disability, at least insofar as it impairs this activity.
A person is regarded as having full-blown AIDS when his or her CD4+
count drops below 200 cells/rm3 of blood or when CD4+ cells compro-
mise less than 14% of his or her total lymphocytes. During this stage, the
clinical conditions most often associated with HIV, such as pneumocystis
carninii pneumonia, Kaposi's sarcoma, and non-Hodgkins lymphoma, tend
to appear. In addition, the general systemic disorders present during all
stages of the disease, such as fever, weight loss, fatigue lesions, nausea, and
diarrhea, tend to worsen. In most cases, once the patient's CD4+ count
drops below 10 cells/mm3, death soon follows.
Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 635-37 (citations omitted).
13 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (1994).
14 Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 640. A recent study estimates that "15 to 40 percent of infants
born to infected mothers become infected in utero, during labor and delivery or by breast
feeding." Edward M. Connor et al., Reduction of Maternal-Infant Transmission of Human Im-
munodeficiency Virus T)pe 1 with Zidovudine Treatment, 331 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1173, 1173
(1994). However, it has been shown that treating HIV-positive women with AZT
(zidovudine) "reduce [s] the risk of maternal-infant transmission of HIV by approximately
two thirds." 1d. at 1178. These statistics provoke the question of whether society should
encourage, or perhaps even require, all pregnant women to submit to HIV testing. The
answer to this question depends on the extent to which a mother owes a duty to provide
her unborn child with a certain quality of life. The possibility of such an obligation sug-
gests that the fetus itself may have certain protected rights. See infra note 468 and accom-
panying text.
15 H.R REP. No. 101485, pt. 2, at 52 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 334
(relying on the Justice Department Memorandum on the Application of Section 504 of the
1973 Rehabilitation Act to HIV-Infected Individuals, 12 U.S. Op. Off. Legal Counsel 209,
215 (1988)).
16 See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 659-60 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
17 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
18 See, e.g., Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 677 (8th Cir. 1996) (hold-
ing that an employee's infertility is not an impairment that substantially affects a major life
activity under the ADA); Zatarain v. WDSU-Television, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 240, 243 (E.D. La.
1995) (holding that reproduction is not a major life activity under the ADA), affid, 79 F.3d.
1143 (5th Cir. 1996) (unpublished table decision).
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The question thus remains as to whether reproduction as a major
life activity provides the proper means by which to bring HIV infec-
tion within the protection of the ADA. It has been noted that "focus-
ing on reproduction and sexual activity arbitrarily distinguishes
between individuals based on circumstances (the plaintiff's fertility
and reproductive intentions) that have nothing to do with the discrim-
ination at issue," namely, discrimination based on HIV infection and
fear of individuals with HIV.19 The majority in Bragdon incorrectly di-
rected the inquiry as to whether an HI V-infected individual is disabled
under the ADA to "irrelevant questions about the individual's sexual
habits and plans to have children."20 The Court thus ignored two
much more important reasons for considering HIV-infected individu-
als as disabled: (1) a symptomatic HV-infected individual has an im-
pairment of the immune system which substantially limits the ability to
fight infection; and (2) the asymptomatic HIV-infected individual,
while not necessarily physically impaired, is subject to society's "myths
and fears about disability and disease," 21 and thus suffers a disability
under the ADA.
This Note argues that the Supreme Court's decision in Bragdon v.
Abbott wrongly perpetuated a problematic standard for deeming HIV
infection to be a disability under the ADA. This Note proposes a two-
part alternative to the Supreme Court's approach which brings HIV
infection within the statute and yet distinguishes between sympto-
matic and asymptomatic HIV in so doing. Part I traces the history of
disability law in America from the Rehabilitation Act of 197322 to its
modem successor, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, and
outlines the definition of disability under the ADA. Part II looks to
the legislative history of the ADA, as well as the various administrative
regulations by which it is implemented and enforced, to see whether
the statute covers HIV infection as a disability. This Part then de-
scribes the judicial debate prior to Bragdon concerning whether HIV
infection constitutes a per se disability under the ADA and which ma-
jor life activity should provide the basis for this rule. Part III discusses
the case law dealing with the related issue of reproduction as a major
life activity in the context of infertility, which provides a point of de-
parture for analyzing the Bragdon line. Part IV discusses the facts and
19 Elizabeth C. Chambers, Note, Asymptomatic HIV as a Disability Under the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 73 WASH. L. REv. 403, 422-23 (1998).
20 Id at 423.
21 School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1986) (holding that a school teacher with
the contagious disease of tuberculosis is a "handicapped individual" under § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act, which prohibits federally-funded programs from discriminating against
handicapped individuals solely by reason of the handicap).
22 Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (1973) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 701-
796 (1998)).
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primary issues raised by the Bragdon opinion and the dissent. Part V
argues against any per se rule of disability and instead advocates a
case-by-case approach to disability assessment that considers the spe-
cific effect of an impairment on the individual. Although the
Supreme Court effectively established a per se rule in Bragdon, the
new social construction of HIV may warrant treating the disease differ-
ently throughout its spectrum of phases. Within this framework, both
symptomatic and asymptomatic HIV infection can, and should, consti-
tute a disability, but not because they substantially impair the repro-
ductive process. Additionally, this Note rejects the notion that the
inability to reproduce, whether as a result of HIV infection or infertil-
ity, falls within the Fourteenth Amendment protection awarded to the
fundamental right to privacy.
I
AMERICANS WrH DisAnui rms ACT
A. History of the ADA
President George Bush signed the ADA into law in 1990, stating
that it signaled the end of "unjustified segregation and exclusion of
persons with disabilities from the mainstream of American life."23
Congress based the ADA in part on a finding that "some 43,000,000
Americans have one or more physical or mental disabilities, and this
number is increasing as the population as a whole is growing older."24
Additionally, Congress had determined that "discrimination against
individuals with disabilities persists in such critical areas as employ-
ment, housing, public accommodations, ... [and] health services," 25
and that the disabled represent
a discrete and insular minority who have been faced with restric-
tions and limitations, subjected to a history of purposeful unequal
treatment, and relegated to a position of political powerlessness in
our society, based on characteristics that are beyond the control of
such individuals and resulting from stereotypic assumptions not
truly indicative of the individual ability of such individuals to partici-
pate in, and contribute to, society.26
Armed with these findings, Congress stated that the purpose of the
ADA is "to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for
the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabili-
23 CatherineJ. Lanctot, Ad Hoc Decision Making and Per Se Prjudice: How Individualizing
the Determination of "Disability" Undermines the ADA, 42 ViLu. L. REv. 327, 327 (1997) (quot-
ing Statement on Signing the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, PUB. PAPERS 1070
(July 26, 1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
24 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (1) (1994).
25 Id. § 12101(a)(3).
26 Id § 12101(a)(7).
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ties" 27 and to "provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards
addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities."28
These bold pronouncements marked a significant break from the
relatively narrow scope of earlier federal disability legislation. A post-
World War II act prohibited employment discrimination in the
United States Civil Service based on physical handicaps. 29 The Archi-
tectural Barriers Act of 1968 required that buildings constructed, al-
tered, or financed by the federal government be accessible to and
usable by the disabled.30 The Rehabilitation Act of 197331 sought pri-
marily to "rehabilitate" the disabled by "providing vocational rehabili-
tation services to handicapped individuals"3 2 so that they might live
independent, self-sufficient lives and "engage in gainful employ-
ment."33 Title V of the Rehabilitation Act did guarantee certain basic
rights for people with disabilities.34 Its most significant provision, sec-
tion 504, prohibited discrimination against any "otherwise qualified
individual with a disability" in "any program or activity receiving Fed-
eral financial assistance."3 5 However, none of this pre-ADA legislation
contemplated the breadth of the ADA's goals as articulated by Con-
gress: "[T]o assure equality of opportunity, full participation, in-
dependent living, and economic self-sufficiency"36 for the disabled.
Further, the ADA sought to redefine the notion of "disability" in our
society. As noted by one of the ADA's architects, Governor Lowell P.
Weicker, the discrimination that disabled Americans face constitutes
their greatest handicap.3 7 Hence, the ADA specifically targets this
pervasive discrimination rather than attempting to rehabilitate the
physical or mental impairment that qualifies an individual as disabled.
27 Id. § 12101(b)(1).
28 Id § 12101 (b) (2).
29 See Act of June 10, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-617, ch. 434, 62 Stat. 351 (codified as
amended in 5 U.S.C. § 633); see also Lowell P. WeickerJr., Historical Background oftheAmeri-
cans with Disabilities Act, 64 TEMP. L. REv. 387, 387 (1991) (describing the history of disabil-
ity-protection legislation).
30 See Act of Aug. 12, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-480, 82 Stat. 718 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. §§ 4151-4157 (1994)).
31 Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (1973) (codified as amended in 29 U.S.C.A.
§§ 701-796 (1998)).
32 Id. § 2(1).
33 Id.
34 See 29 U.S.C §§ 791-794 (1994). For example, the Act required federal executive
agencies to create affirmative action programs for the "hiring, placement, and advance-
ment of individuals with disabilities." Id. § 791. Similar efforts were required by govern-
ment contractors on contracts exceeding $10,000. See id, § 793. The Act also established
the Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board to enforce compliance
with the Architectural Barriers Act. See id. § 792.
35 Id § 794. A 1978 amendment to the Act extended this coverage to federal execu-
tive agencies and the United States Postal Service. SeeAct of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-
602, § 119(2), 92 Stat. 2955, 2982 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. 794(a)-(b) (1988)).
36 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (8) (1994).
37 See Weicker, supra note 29, at 390, 392.
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B. Definition of Disability
The ADA achieves its stated goals via a broad three-prong defini-
tion of disability,38 which modifies the definition of disability set forth
in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.39 Each subchapter of the ADA spe-
cifically delegates authority to the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) or the Department of Justice (DOJ) to imple-
ment and regulate its provisions. 40 Consequently, EEOC and DOJ
regulations and guidelines prove useful in interpreting the scope of
this definition.
1. Impairment That Substantially Limits a Major Life Activity
The first prong of the ADA's definition covers those who are dis-
abled in the traditional sense of the word-by a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits a major life activity.4 ' This prong
consists of three elements, each of which must be satisfied for an indi-
vidual to qualify as disabled.
a. Impairment
In its Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provi-
sions of the Americans with Disabilities Act,42 the EEOC defines "phys-
ical or mental impairment" as follows:
(1) Any physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigure-
ment, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following
body systems: neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs,
respiratory (including speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive,
38 The ADA defines disability as "(A) a physical or mental impairment that substan-
tially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such
an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C.
§ 12102(2).
39 The 1973 version of the Rehabilitation Act used the word "handicapped" rather
than "disabled," defining it in terms of one's ability to work:
The term "handicapped individual" means any individual who (A) has a
physical or mental disability which for such individual constitutes or results
in a substantial handicap to employment and (B) can reasonably be ex-
pected to benefit in terms of employability from vocational rehabilitation
services provided pursuant to tiles I and III of this Act.
Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 7(6), 87 Stat. 355, 361 (1973). Later amendments substituted "disa-
bility" for "handicapped individual" and incorporated the language that would later ap-
pear in the ADA three-prong definition. See Pub. L. 93-516, § 111, 88 Stat. 1617, 1619
(1974).
40 Subchapter I (Employment) delegates regulatory authority to the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission. See 42 U.S.C. § 12116. Subchapter II (Public Services)
delegates regulatory authority to the Attorney General. See id. § 12134. Subchapter III
(Public Accommodations and Services Operated by Private Entities) also delegates regula-
tory authority to the Attorney General, with the exception of "[t]ransportation provisions"
covered under § 12182(a). Id. § 12186(b).
41 See id. § 12102(2) (A).
42 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630 (1998).
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digestive, genito-urinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin, and endocrine;
or
(2) Any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retarda-
tion, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and spe-
cific learning disabilities.43
The DOJ regulations parallel this language very closely, but add a list
of various diseases and conditions which qualify as a "physical or
mental impairment."44 While the list is extensive, the appendix to the
regulations makes clear that it is not comprehensive, "particularly in
light of the fact that other conditions or disorders may be identified in
the future."45
b. Substantially Limits
The EEOC defines "substantially limits" as follows:
(i) Unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in
the general population can perform; or
(ii) Significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration
under which an individual can perform a particular major life activ-
ity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which
the average person in the general population can perform that
same major life activity.4 6
Three factors should be considered in determining whether an indi-
vidual is substantially limited in a major life activity:
(i) The nature and severity of the impairment;
(ii) The duration or expected duration of the impairment; and
(iii) The permanent or long term impact, or the expected perma-
nent or long term impact of or resulting from the impairment.4 7
The DOJ recommends consideration of similar factors, stating
that a person's impairment will be substantially limiting "when the in-
dividual's important life activities are restricted as to the conditions,
manner, or duration under which they can be performed in compari-
son to most people."48 The DOJ emphasizes that "trivial impair-
43 R § 1630.2(h)(1)-(2).
44 28 G.FR. § 36.104(1) (iii) (1998). The DOJ regulations define disability as follows:
[P]hysical or mental impairment includes, but is not limited to, such conta-
gious and noncontagious diseases and conditions as orthopedic, visual,
speech, and hearing impairments, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, muscular dystro-
phy, multiple sclerosis, cancer, heart disease, diabetes, mental retardation,
emotional illness, specific learning disabilities, HIV disease (whether sympto-
matic or asymptomatic), tuberculosis, drug addiction, and alcoholism.
Id. (emphasis added).
45 Preamble to Regulation on Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability by Public
Accommodations and in Commercial Facilities, 28 G.F.R. pt. 36 app. B § 36.104, at 582
(1998).
46 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i)-(ii).
47 ld § 1630.20) (2) (i)-(iii).
48 28 C.F.R. pt. 36 app. B § 36.104, at 582-83.
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ment[s], such as a simple infected finger," do not fall within the
statute and strongly suggests that "temporary" impairments do not
qualify for protection either.49
According to the EEOC interpretive guidelines, few impairments
are per se substantially limiting.50 Rather, the EEOC advocates analy-
sis of impairments on a case-by-case basis, focusing "on the effect of
that impairment on the life of the individual." 51 Some impairments,
however, are inherently substantially limiting, thus eliminating the
need for this case-specific analysis. 52 For example, the EEOC cites
HIV infection as an example of an inherently substantially limiting
impairment.55
c. Major Life Activity
"Major life activities," as defined by both the EEOC and the DOJ,
include "functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual
tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and
working. '54 Yet, the EEOC interpretive guidelines admit that this list
is not exhaustive and provide other examples of major life activities,
such as sitting, standing, lifting, and reaching.55 Section 902 of the
EEOC Compliance Manual adds "[mlental and emotional processes
such as thinking, concentrating, and interacting with others" to this
list.56 Ultimately, major life activities "are those basic activities that the
average person in the general population can perform with little or
no difficulty."57
2. Record of Impairment
The EEOC and the DOJ define the phrase "has a record of such
impairment" to mean "has a history of, or has been misclassified as
having, a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one
or more major life activities."58 This provision seeks to "ensure that
people are not discriminated against because of a history of disability,"
49 Id at 583.
50 See Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 29
C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.20), at 347 (1998).
51 Id. at 347 ("Some impairments may be disabling for particular individuals but not
for others, depending on the stage of the disease or disorder, the presence of other impair-
ments that combine to make the impairment disabling or any number of other factors.").
52 See id
53 See idL Discussion of such per se disabilities is deferred until Part II. See infra Part
II.B.
54 29 G.F.R § 1630.2(i); see also 28 G.F.R. § 36.104(2) (also defining disability).
55 See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(i), at 347.
56 EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) 1 6883, § 902.3 (1995).
57 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(i), at 347.
58 29 C.F.R- § 1630.2(k); see also 28 C.F.R. § 36.104(3) (also defining a record of
impairment).
1999]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
such as a misdiagnosed learning disability,59 and to protect those "who
have recovered from a physical or mental impairment that previously
substantially limited them in a major life activity. '60
3. Regarded as Having an Impairment
The final "regarded as" prong of the ADA's disability test sweeps
broadly to encompass individuals with impairments who do not fall
within the first two prongs, but nonetheless suffer from discrimina-
tion.61 In this way, the ADA attacks discrimination as a moral wrong
in itself, penalizing discriminatory attitudes expressed towards the os-
tensibly disabled. The EEOC and DOJ regulations list three ways in
which an individual can come under the protection of this section. A
qualifying individual
(1) Has a physical or mental impairment that does not substantially
limit major life activities but is treated by a covered entity as consti-
tuting such limitation;
(2) Has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
major life activities only as a result of the attitudes of others toward
such impairment; or
(3) Has none of the impairments defined in paragraph (h) (1) or
(2) of this section but is treated by a covered entity as having a sub-
stantially limiting impairment.6 2
In School Board v. Arline,63 the Supreme Court articulated the ra-
tionale for the "regarded as" prong in the context of the Rehabilita-
tion Act of 1973. In this case, the plaintiff was hospitalized for
tuberculosis in 1957 but taught elementary school in Florida for the
next twenty years while the disease was in remission.64 After suffering
her second and third relapses, the school board suspended the plain-
tiff with pay for the remainder of the academic year, after which time
the plaintiff was discharged. 65 Plaintiff brought suit in federal court,
alleging that the school board's decision to dismiss her based on the
contagious nature of tuberculosis violated section 504 of the Rehabili-
tation Act of 1973.66 The Court held that the plaintiff's hospitaliza-
tion in 1957 qualified her as handicapped under the "record of
impairment" prong of the Rehabilitation Act test.67 The contagious-
ness of tuberculosis did not warrant excluding all individuals with "ac-
59 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(k), at 349.
60 28 C.F.R. pt. 36 app. B § 36.104, at 583.
61 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
62 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(0; see also 28 G.R. §36.104(4) (same).
63 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
64 See id at 276.
65 See id
66 See id. at 276-77.
67 See id at 285-86.
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tual or perceived contagious diseases" from the Act's coverage. 68 In so
holding, the Court noted that a contagious impairment might not
substantially limit an individual's physical or mental abilities, but that
the negative reactions of others to such a disease could well impair
that individual's ability to work.69 The Court concluded that by in-
cluding the regarded as prong in the Rehabilitation Act's definition,
"Congress acknowledged that society's accumulated myths and fears
about disability and disease are as handicapping as are the physical
limitations that flow from actual impairment." 70
C. Direct Threat Exception
Subchapter I of the ADA prohibits discrimination against dis-
abled individuals by any person who owns, leases, or operates a place
of public accommodation. 71 This subchapter is not central to the
analysis in Bragdon v. Abbott,72 but it is worth noting here because it
contains an exception to the otherwise broad prohibitions of the ADA
that potentially offers relief to the medical community when dealing
with HIV-infected patients. Section 12182(b) (3) states:
Nothing in this subchapter shall require an entity to permit an indi-
vidual to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages and accommodations of such entity where
such individual poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others
.. that cannot be eliminated by a modification of policies, prac-
tices, or procedures or by the provision of auxiliary aids or
services. 73
The DOJ leaves determination of what constitutes a direct threat
up to the public entity, requiring that it make this decision on an indi-
vidualized basis and in reliance on "current medical knowledge or on
the best available objective evidence, to ascertain: the nature, dura-
tion, and severity of the risk; the probability that the potential injury
will actually occur; and whether reasonable modifications of policies,
practices, or procedures will mitigate the risk."74
68 Id. at 285.
69 See id. at 283.
70 Md at 284.
71 See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (1994) ("No individual shall be discriminated against on
the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privi-
leges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any per-
son who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.").
72 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
73 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(3) (1994).
74 28 C.F.R § 36.208(c) (1998). The "direct threat" exception codifies the standard
first articulated by the Supreme Court in Arline, 480 U.S. at 287-88. In Arline, the Court
recognized a need to balance the interests of disabled individuals against public safety
concerns. See id.; see also Preamble to Regulation on Nondiscrimination on the Basis of
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The "direct threat" exception prompts examination of the possi-
bility that HIV-infected individuals present a risk of transmission to
certain medical personnel. 75 Despite the general medical consensus
that the risk of transmission in the patient-provider context is small, 76
the risk of infection is real and the consequences are grave. It has
been noted that patients lack any formal legal obligation to protect
their healthcare providers from risk comparable to the duty of health-
care professionals to avoid causing harm to their patients.77 Fearful
providers may thus be inclined to limit an HIV-infected individual's
access to medical care by choosing to perform only noninvasive proce-
dures, referring infected patients to other providers or denying care
completely. The outcome of any ADA claim against a provider will
thus depend on a careful balancing of two values inherent in the ADA
and its "direct threat" exception: "the non-discrimination principle
and the goal of risk reduction. 78
II
HIV INFECION AS A DisABILTy UNDER THE ADA
According to a recent report by the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC), 665,357 Americans have been infected with
the HIV virus and subsequently developed acquired immu-
nodeficiency syndrome (AIDS). 79 As of June 1998, 261,560 individu-
als were living with AIDS, while 90,819 were reported as infected but
asymptomatic (HIV positive, but not displaying the symptoms of
Disability by Public Accommodations and in Commercial Facilities, 28 C.F.R pt. 36 app. B
§ 36.208, at 598 (1998) (describing the Arline decision and the "direct threat" exception).
75 See Mary Anne Bobinski, Patients and Providers in the Courts: Fractures in the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 61 ALB. L. REv. 785, 788 (1998) ("The precise risk of HIV transmission
in health care settings is unknown. The opportunity for transmission is clear."). HIV may be
transmitted when bodily fluids of an infected individual come in contact with "an open
sore or mucosal membrane of an uninfected person." Id. For example, a health care
worker or physician who "sustains a cut during surgery" could contract HIV if then ex-
posed to the infected fluids of the patient. Id. Conversely, patients are at risk of acquiring
HIV from an infected health care worker or physician who "sustains a cut during surgery"
and then "bleeds into a patient's open wound." Id. To reduce the risk of HV transmission
from patient to provider, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) recom-
mends the use of "universal precautions," which treat all patients as "potential sources of
blood-borne infections." Id. at 794. Health care workers use various prophylactics such as
gloves "to reduce the likelihood of coming into contact with the blood or infectious body
fluids of patients." Id. To reduce the risk of transmission from provider to patient, the
CDC advises that HIV-positive health care workers refrain from performing "exposure-
prone procedures," unless they have obtained the informed consent of the patient and the
permission of an expert review board. Id. at 791.
76 See id. at 796.
77 See id. at 822-23.
78 Id. at 802.
79 See CDC, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., U.S. HV and AIDS Cases Reported
Through June 1998, 10 HIV/AIDS SURKvmLANCE REP., Midyear ed. 1998, at 3.
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AIDS) .80 Certainly, few would argue with the proposition that the
United States has established an embarrassing record of discrimina-
tion against HIV-infected individuals over the past fifteen years.
As noted above, Congress adopted a broad definition of disability
in the ADA, intending to protect the disabled not only from discrimi-
nation based on actual physical or mental impairments, but also from
discriminatory treatment flowing from stereotypical assumptions
about a disabled person's ability to contribute to society.8 ' However,
despite the apparent scope of the three-prong test, it remains unclear
whether asymptomatic HIV-infected individuals fall within the ADA's
definition of disability and thus qualify for protection from employ-
ment and public accommodation discrimination.8 2 Furthermore, the
ADA itself is silent as to what major life activity, if any, might be sub-
stantially limited such that HIV infection, even if asymptomatic, could
be brought within the statute's protection.
A. Interpreting the ADA to Cover HIV Infection
The judicial debate as to ADA coverage of both the symptomatic
and the asymptomatic invariably turns on this question of whether
HIV infection substantially limits a major life activity. Despite the
ADA's silence, courts have recourse to a wealth of extrinsic aids to
help them interpret the statute, including the legislative history of the
ADA, various EEOC and DOJ regulations and compliance manuals,
and case law and standards developed under the Rehabilitation Act of
1973.83
1. Legislative History
Carlis and McCabe point out that Congress conceived of the ADA
in a political environment in which it seemed clear that new federal
legislation prohibiting disability-based discrimination might well in-
clude all stages of HIV infection as a disability.8 4 For example, in July
of 1988, Surgeon General C. Everett Koop wrote to Douglas Kmiec,
Acting Assistant Attorney General in the Office of Legal Counsel of
the Department ofJustice, concerning the "medical and public health
80 See id. at 5 tbl.l. These numbers represent only those cases reported to the CDC.
81 See supra Part IA.
82 See Chambers, supra note 19, at 403-04.
83 See 42 U.S.C. § 12201 (a) (1994) ("Except as otherwise provided in this chapter,
nothing in this chapter shall be construed to apply a lesser standard than the standards
applied under title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 or the regulations issued by Federal
agencies pursuant to such title." (citations omitted)). See infra Part V for a discussion of
the appropriate weight courts should afford these authorities when interpreting a statute.
84 See Michael D. Carlis & Scott A. McCabe, Comment, Are There No Per Se Disabilities
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act? The Fate of Asymptomatic HlVDisease, 57 Mr). L. REv.
558, 569 (1998).
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concerns regarding discrimination and the current HIV epidemic."8 5
The Surgeon General essentially argued that no bright line can be
drawn between symptomatic and asymptomatic HIV, stating that
"from a purely scientific perspective, persons with HIV infection are
clearly impaired" and "are not comparable to an immune carrier of a
contagious disease" because "they may appear outwardly healthy but
are in fact seriously ill."86 Dr. Koop asserted that the government's
"primary public health strategy is prevention of HIV transmission. 8 7
He thus advocated an attack on HIV-related discrimination to en-
courage counseling and testing for HIV,88 presumably out of concern
for those who might avoid such services for fear of revealing their HIV
status in a hostile environment.
The Surgeon General letter prompted President Reagan's Coun-
sel to request an opinion from the Department of Justice as to
whether section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 covered those
infected with HIV.8 9 In the resultant opinion letter, Kmiec concluded
that section 504 covers both symptomatic and asymptomatic HIV-in-
fected individuals, provided they are "otherwise qualified" under the
statute.9 0
85 Justice Department Memorandum on the Application of Section 504 of the 1973
Rehabilitation Act to HIV-Infected Individuals, 12 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 209, 230-31
(1988), reprinted in 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 405:18-19 (1998) [hereinafter Applica-
tion of Section 504] (letter datedJuly 29, 1988 from Dr. C. Everett Koop, Surgeon General
of Public Health Services, to Douglas Kmiec, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of
Legal Counsel, Department ofJusice) [hereinafter Surgeon General Letter].
86 Id. at 405:19.
87 Id. at 405:18.
88 See id
89 See Carlis & McCabe, supra note 84, at 570-72.
90 Application of Section 504, supra note 85, at 405:1-2 (memorandum dated Sept. 27,
1988 from Douglas W. Kmiec, Acting Assistance Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel,
Department ofJustice, to Arthur B. Culvahouse,Jr., Counsel to the President) [hereinafter
Kmiec Memorandum]. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act guarantees that no "other-
wise qualified" handicapped individuals will be excluded from any programs or benefits
that receive federal funds. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994). Originally, the Rehabilitation Act de-
fined an "otherwise qualified" handicapped individual as one who "can reasonably be ex-
pected to benefit in terms of employability from vocational rehabilitation services provided
pursuant to titles I and III of this Act." Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112,
§ 7(6) (b), 87 Stat. 355. The 1988 amendments excluded from those "otherwise qualified"
any
individual who has a currently contagious disease or infection and who, by
reason of such disease or infection, would constitute a direct threat to the
health or safety of other individuals or who, by reason of the currently con-
tagious disease or infection, is unable to perform the duties of the job.
29 U.S.C. § 706(8) (D). Thus, at least in the employment context, the Kmiec memoran-
dum contemplates the possibility that an HIV-infected individual might pose a direct
threat to fellow employees or customers, or by reason of his HIV infection, be unable to
perform hisjob. In this case, an employer would not violate the ADA by firing or refusing
to hire such an individual.
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First, relying on the Supreme Court's holding in School Board v.
Arline,91 Kmiec asserted that the contagiousness of HIV could not re-
move symptomatic individuals from section 504.92 Additionally, he
stated that the substantial limiting effects of various clinical symptoms
associated with symptomatic HIV (i.e., weakening of the immune sys-
tem leading to development of cancer or pneumonia) warrant includ-
ing such individuals under section 504's "individual with handicaps"
definition of disability.93 Given the fact that AIDS often requires hos-
pitalization, Kmiec reasoned that a substantial limitation of one or
more major life activities naturally follows. 9 4 But, beyond the refer-
ence to HIV's assault on the immune system, Kmiec failed to indicate
which major life activity is substantially limited by symptomatic HIV
infection.
Second, he argued that section 504 covers asymptomatic individu-
als who do not appear outwardly disabled "based either on the effect
that the knowledge of infection will have on the individual or the ef-
fect that knowledge of the infection will have on others."95 Regarding
the first part of this test, Kmiec suggested that an HIV-infected individ-
ual's decision to forgo having children due to the substantial risk of
transmitting HIV to his or her offspring constituted a behavioral
choice completely dependant on HIV.96 Assuming that procreation is
a major life activity under section 504, courts might find that HIV lim-
its a major life activity and thus qualifies an individual for coverage
under the first prong of the Rehabilitation Act's definition of disabil-
ity.97 Additionally, section 504 could protect HIV-infected individuals
via the "regarded as" prong98 of the Rehabilitation Act's definition of
"handicapped individual."99 Kmiec argued that the Supreme Court's
decision in Arline expanded the scope of the "regarded as" prong to
include those who have no incapacity at present, but are nonetheless
substantially limited in a major life activity because others perceive
them as handicapped. 100 Consequently, an asymptomatic individual,
although not visibly incapacitated, could qualify as handicapped if
those aware of his infection treat him as such.1 1
Passage of the ADA seems to have had little effect on the conclu-
sions reached by the Office of Legal Counsel. In 1994, the office pub-
91 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
92 See Kmiec Memorandum, supra note 90, at 405:3-4.
93 See id. at 405:4.
94 See id. at 405:6.
95 I&
96 See id. at 405:6-7.
97 See id
98 See 29 U.S.C. § 705(20) (B) (iii) (1998).
99 See Kmiec Memorandum, supra note 90, at 405:7-8.
100 See ia.
101 See id. at 405:8.
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lished a follow-up to the Kmiec memorandum that essentially
confirmed its findings within the context of the ADA. 10 2 Deputy Assis-
tant Attorney General Dawn E. Johnsen drew no distinction between
symptomatic and asymptomatic HIV infection, asserting that "HIV in-
fection, whether or not an individual has developed any overt symp-
toms as a result of the infection, is a disability under the
Rehabilitation Act and under the Americans with Disabilities Act."' 03
This opinion letter thus suggests that HIV infection is a per se disabil-
ity whether or not an individual exhibits any physical symptoms of
AIDS.
Indeed, a review of the House and Senate reports regarding the
history of the ADA reveals that Congress did not condition coverage
of HIV infection as a disability on the symptomatic-asymptomatic dis-
tinction. Instead, the legislative history provides strong evidence that
Congress intended HIV infection to constitute a per se disability. For
example, in its discussion of the meaning of "disability" under the
ADA, the House Education and Labor Committee conceded that it
would be impossible to list every physical or mental impairment; 0 4
however, the Committee expressly included "infection with the
Human Immunodeficiency Virus" on its non-exhaustive list.10 5 The
Committee then laid down a per se rule, noting that "a person in-
fected with Human Immunodeficiency Virus is covered under the first
prong of the definition of the term 'disability' because of a substantial
limitation to procreation and intimate sexual relationships."'0 6 The
House Judiciary Committee similarly included HIV infection on its
non-exhaustive list of physical and mental impairments, 10 7 noting
"[p] ersons infected with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus are con-
sidered to have an impairment that substantially limits a major life
activity, and thus are considered disabled under the first test of the
definition."' 08 Finally, the Senate Committee on Labor and Human
102 SeeJustice Department Memorandum on the Review of 1988 Opinion Concerning
the Applicability of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act to Individuals Infected with HIV,
18 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 141, 141 (1994) ("The subsequent passage of the Americans
with Disabilities Act did not alter the analysis of cases arising under the Rehabilitation Act,
although an amendment to section 504 now requires reference to standards set forth in
the ADA.") [hereinafter Johnsen Memorandum].
103 I&
104 See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 51 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.CA.N. 303,
333.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 334 (citing Kmiec Memorandum, supra note 90, at 405:5-6).
107 See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 28 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445,
451.
108 Id& at 451 n.18 (citing Kmiec Memorandum, supra note 90, at 405:5). But see H.R.
REP. No. 101-485, pt. 4, at 80-83 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.CAN. 512, 564-65 (House
Committee on Energy and Commerce, Dissenting Views on the Americans with Disabilities
Act). These dissenters argue, somewhat violently, that the DOJ wrongly extended the Ar-
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Resources agreed that HIV infection constitutes a physical or mental
impairment'0 9 and is therefore covered under the first prong of the
ADA definition of "disability."110
These reports represent only the highlights of a much larger
body of extrinsic material available to aid in the interpretation of the
ADA. Clearly, however, this limited overview indicates that "[d]uring
the years immediately preceding the enactment of the ADA, every in-
dicator of congressional intent unequivocally pointed toward the con-
clusion that individuals with asymptomatic HIV disease were covered
as individuals with a 'disability.""'"
2. Implementing Regulations
The EEOC and DOJ implementing regulations reinforce the
clear implication of these congressional reports: HIV infection is per
se disabling regardless of whether an infected individual is sympto-
matic or asymptomatic.
line standard to include asymptomatic HIV-infected individuals, and that therefore, the
ADA constitutes a "homosexual rights bill in disguise." Id. at 565.
109 See S. REP. No. 101-116, at 22 (1990).
110 See id. (citing Kmiec Memorandum, supra note 90, at 404:5). The Senate Report
does not specifically state what major life activity HIV infection impairs for purposes of the
statute. However, in its explicit reliance on the Kmiec memorandum, the Committee on
Labor and Human Resources must have assumed that HIV substantially limits the major
life activity of reproduction.
111 Carlis & McCabe, supra note 84, at 580. Carlis and McCabe refer to various state-
ments by members of Congress regarding the intended coverage of HIV-infected individu-
als under the ADA. See id- at 573-77 & nn.91-99. For example, they note the following
statements: (1) "People with HIV disease are individuals who have any condition along the
full spectrum of HIV infection-[including] asymptomatic HIV infection .... These indi-
viduals[ ] have a physical impairment that substantially limits a major life activity," id. at
576 n.91 (quoting 136 CONG. REC. S9696 (daily ed. July 13, 1990) (statement of Senator
Kennedy)) (internal quotation marks omitted); and (2) "It is of exceptional significance
that this bill will offer protection to the thousands of Americans with HIV disease-from
those who are asymptomatic to those with fully developed AIDS. Persons living with HIV
disease suffer from all the forms of discrimination found in our society," id. at 576 n.92
(quoting 136 CONG. REc. H2442 (daily ed. May 17, 1990) (statement of Rep. Weiss) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)). Carlis and McCabe also cite Democratic Representative
Jim McDermott:
I am particularly pleased that [the ADA] will finally also extend necessary
protection to people with HIV disease.... As a physician, I know that
although the major life activity that is affected at any point along the spec-
trum by the HIV infection may be different, an effect on some major life
activity exists from the time of HIV infection.
Id. at 576 (quoting 136 CONG. Rxc. H2626 (daily ed. May 22, 1990) (statement of Rep.
McDermott)) (internal quotation marks omitted). For an in-depth treatment of congres-
sional intent as to HIV coverage under the ADA and the legislative history surrounding
enactment of the ADA, see id. at 569-80.
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a. EEOC Regulations
As mentioned above, the EEOC interpretative guidelines require
that a determination of whether an impairment substantially limits a
major life activity must be made on a case-by-case basis by accounting
for the effect of an impairment on the life of the particular individual
in question.'1 2 Nevertheless, the EEOC admits that certain impair-
ments are "inherently substantially limiting" regardless of whom they
might affect and thus constitute per se disabilities, 1 3 the illustrative
example being HIV infection. 14 Significantly, in sweepingly granting
HIV-infection disability status irrespective of the symptomatic-asymp-
tomatic distinction, the EEOC neglects to mention, or perhaps pur-
posefully omits, any discussion of the precise major life activity
(reproduction or other) HIV infection might substantially limit in all
cases.
b. DOJ Regulations
The DOJ specifically includes "HIV disease (whether symptomatic
or asymptomatic)" on its list of physical or mental impairments cov-
ered under the ADA definition of disability." 5 The DOJ interpretive
guidelines discuss this characterization in light of the 1988 Kmiec
memorandum, 1 6 which concluded that HIV infection is an impair-
ment that substantially limits a major life activity.117 The use of "or"
between "symptomatic" and "asymptomatic" in the parenthetical fol-
lowing "HIV disease" further suggests that one should ignore any dis-
tinction between the two phases of HIV infection for the purpose of
establishing a disability based thereon."18 In fact, reference to the
Kmiec memorandum only strengthens the implication that HIV infec-
tion is a per se disability. As with the EEOC interpretive guidelines,
the DOJ appendix fails to tie this per se disability rule to a particular
major life activity which is substantially limited by HIV infection. 119
While the EEOC and DOJ guidelines certainly support the con-
clusion that HIV infection is a per se disability under the ADA, they
112 See Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 29
C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(j), at 347 (1998) ("Some impairments may be disabling for
particular individuals but not for others, depending on the stage of the disease or disorder,
the presence of other impairments that combine to make the impairment disabling or any
number of other factors.").
113 Id.
114 See id.
115 28 C.F.R. § 36.104(1)(iii) (1998).
116 See Kmiec Memorandum, supra note 90.
117 See Preamble to Regulation on Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability by Pub-
lic Accommodations and in Commercial Facilities, 28 C.F.R. pt. 36 app. B § 36.104, at 582
(1998).
118 28 C.F.R. § 36.104(1) (iii).
119 See 28 C.F.R. pt. 36 app. B § 36.104, at 582.
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conspicuously omit the references made in the legislative history to
reproduction as the major life activity that HIV substantially limits.
Perhaps this omission constitutes no more than a natural function of a
per se rule-if the disability is automatic, then the usual three-part
inquiry (physical or mental impairment; substantially limits; major life
activity) required by the first prong of the ADA's disability test is by
definition irrelevant. Alternatively, the omission might reflect some
measure of uncertainty on the part of the EEOC and the DOJ as to the
precise rationale for making HIV infection a per se disability; after all,
at least in the asymptomatic stage, one could argue that HIV is not
substantially limiting. The Kmiec memorandum suggested that
asymptomatic individuals could be deemed disabled under the Reha-
bilitation Act if their infection is known to an employer or other entity
because they might be "regarded as" having an impairment that sub-
stantially limits a major life activity when in fact they do not.120 But,
pushing the asymptomatic into the "regarded as" prong still leaves un-
answered the question of what major life activity is substantially lim-
ited for the symptomatic. As the next Part argues, reproduction is not
the answer.
3. Pre-ADA Cases
Prior to enactment of the ADA, most federal courts regarded HIV
infection as an absolute disability, although some criticize the analyses
adopted in reaching this conclusion as less than thorough. 121
In the well-publicized case of Thomas v. Atascadero Unified School
District,122 a federal district court in California held that an HIV-posi-
tive child, Ryan Thomas, was "handicapped" under the Rehabilitation
Act, but "otherwise qualified" to attend kindergarten, in the absence
of any evidence that he posed a significant risk of harm to his class-
mates or teachers. 123 The court stated that "[p] ersons infected with
the AIDS virus suffer significant impairments of their major life activi-
ties" 124 and that even asymptomatic individuals are substantially lim-
ited in their ability to reproduce. 125
The court noted that Ryan "suffer[ed] from significant impair-
ment of his major life activities." 126 Indeed, Ryan experienced re-
peated pulmonary and ear complications, as well as chronic
120 See Kmiec Memorandum, supra note 90, at 405:6-7.
121 See Carlis & McCabe, supra note 84, at 580-81.
122 662 F. Supp. 376 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
123 See id at 381-82.
124 Id. at 379. As examples of such significantly impaired major life activities, the court
listed "caring for [oneself], performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking,
breathing, learning and working." I&
125 See id.
126 Id.
1999]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
lymphadenopathy during the first four years of his life. However, he
had been relatively healthy and had experienced no recent complica-
tions for more than a year following his diagnosis and the commence-
ment of treatment. 127 Both of Ryan's treating physicians notified the
defendant school district in writing that no "medical reason" existed
that would preclude Ryan from attending school.128 Although the
court did not specify whether Ryan was symptomatic or asymptomatic,
the noted symptoms are consistent with those attributed to asymptom-
atic HIV.129 If we thus assume that Ryan was indeed asymptomatic, or
at least sufficiently far removed from the symptomatic range of the
HIV spectrum to function in school on a daily basis, then we must
wonder exactly what major life activity was substantially limited by his
infection. The court must have half-consciously relied on its own
statement that "[e]ven those who are asymptomatic have abnormali-
ties in their hemic and reproductive systems making procreation and
childbirth dangerous to themselves and others." 30
But rather than any substantial limitation of the major life activity
of reproduction, which seems obviously irrelevant to a six-year-old
boy, the importance of Thomas rests more on the manner in which he
was perceived by the defendant school district.' 3l For example, the
school ejected Ryan from class and relegated him to home tutoring,
pursuant to a school district policy regarding the admission of stu-
dents infected with "communicable diseases."'1 2 Following an inci-
dent in which Ryan bit the leg of another child but did not break the
skin, a county psychologist evaluated Ryan and concluded that he
would "behave 'aggressively' in a kindergarten setting because his
level of social and language skills and maturity was below those of his
classmates.' 33 The school district clearly feared that Ryan would
transmit HIV to other school children via the exchange of bodily se-
cretions through biting. 13 4 Nevertheless, the court held that the
127 See id at 379-80.
128 Id at 380.
129 For a description of asymptomatic HIV, see supra note 12.
130 Thomas, 662 F. Supp. at 379.
131 See id. at 382 ("Ryan Thomas has been subjected to different treatment from the
treatment received by other kindergarten students in the District and excluded from his
kindergarten class because of his 'handicap.'").
132 Id. at 380-81.
'33 Id. at 380.
134 See id. at 381. In deciding to remove Ryan from school, the school district relied on
the following information and recommendations published by the CDC regarding the edu-
cation of children infected with the AIDS virus:
For the infected preschool-aged child and for some neurologically handi-
capped children who lack control of their body secretions or who display
behavior, such as biting, and those children who have uncoverable, oozing
lesions, a more restricted environment is advisable until more is known
about transmission in these settings. Children infected with HTLV-III/LAV
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school district did not present sufficient medical evidence to prove
that human bites could transmit the AIDS virus.' 3 5 Consequently, the
court concluded that the school district had treated Ryan differently
than his classmates and had excluded him from kindergarten solely
because of his "handicap."' 36
A more rigorous analysis of the Rehabilitation Act suggests that
because Ryan was asynptomatic and medically able to attend kinder-
garten, he did not suffer from an impairment that substantially lim-
ited a major life activity under the first prong of the definition of
disability.'3 7 Rather, his HIV infection created a misperception that
he was handicapped, based on a lack of knowledge in the medical
community as to the vectors for transmitting HIV.13 8 Consequently,
the "regarded as" prong of the Rehabilitation Act139 offered the more
appropriate basis for qualifying Ryan as handicapped and thus enti-
tling him to the protection he deserved, without resorting to some
vague predictions about the effect of HIV on his future reproductive
choices.
In Cain v. Hyatt,140 the United States District Court for the East-
ern District of Pennsylvania similarly conflated the first ("substantially
limits a major life activity") and third ("regarded as") prongs of the
Rehabilitation Act. Here, the court granted punitive damages to an
attorney whose law firm dismissed him after discovering that he had
AIDS.141 The court held that AIDS constitutes a handicap under the
Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, which adopts the Rehabilitation
Act's disability standard,142 and that the plaintiff established that the
firm discharged him on the basis of his handicap. 143
In reaching this conclusion, the court articulated two reasons jus-
tifying the inclusion of AIDS under the statutory definition of a handi-
cap: "First, both the underlying viral condition and the symptomology
[HIV] should be cared for and educated in settings that minimize exposure
of other children to blood or body fluids.
Id.
135 See id. at 382.
136 See id.
137 See 29 U.S.C.A. § 705(20) (B) (i) (1998). The Rehabilitation Act lays out the same
three-prong test for disability later employed by the ADA.
138 The court actually implied this misperception in determining that the medical re-
port relied on by defendants provided insufficient information regarding HIV on which to
base a school policy. See Thomas, 662 F. Supp. at 381.
139 See 29 U.S.C.. § 705(20) (B) (iii).
140 734 F. Supp. 671 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
141 See id 686-87.
142 See itt at 677-78. The court cited substantial authority, including Thomas, 662 F.
Supp. 376, to support this conclusion, noting that "the consensus of opinion holds AIDS
qualifies as a handicap or disability under various federal and state antidiscrimination
laws." 734 F. Supp. at 678.
143 See it at 680-81.
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of AIDS give rise to physical impairments that substantially limit one's
abilities to engage in major life activities. Second, societal prejudices
deem persons with AIDS as having such an impairment."' 44 This in-
terpretation suggests that asymptomatic individuals, while perhaps not
physically impaired in their daily lives, would nevertheless qualify as
handicapped under the "regarded as" prong of the Rehabilitation Act.
Indeed, the court admitted that society's misconceptions about HIV
often substantially limit the lives of HIV-infected individuals. 45 Find-
ing that the defendants "considered the plaintiff to be handi-
capped,"' 46 the court thus effectively applied the "regarded as prong"
of the Rehabilitation Act without explicitly claiming to do so.
However, the court also argued in dictum that the statute should
cover asymptomatic individuals because an HIV carrier cannot
reproduce without endangering the lives of both that person's partner
and potential offspring.147 Therefore, this significant injury to the re-
productive system substantially limits a major life activity because
"[t]he interests in conceiving and raising one's own children" consti-
tute a "basic civil libert[y]. " 148
The court need never have gone this far in search of a major life
activity to which to tie the substantially limiting effects of HIV. First,
the court could simply have contented itself with covering Cain under
the "regarded as" prong as they implicitly did anyway, without ever
arguing that he suffered from a substantial limitation of any major life
activity. In fact, the "regarded as" analysis better targets what we find
on a base level to be the moral wrong committed here: Cain's col-
leagues discriminated against him because they feared his infection
and thus incorrectly viewed him as unable to perform his job ade-
quately. Second, if determined to ground Cain's suffering in a major
life activity under the first prong, the court simply could have stopped
at its own statement that HIV disables white blood cells, which "creates
a physiological disorder of the hemic (blood) and lymphatic sys-
tems."' 49 Surely, a fully functioning immune system is a prerequisite
for fighting infection, which in turn is necessary for survival. HIV, at
least at the symptomatic stage, thus substantially limits the major life
activity of fighting infections.
144 I at 678.
145 See id. at 680 (noting that almost one third of the American population believes
AIDS to be at least as contagious as, if not more contagious than, the common cold).
146 Id.
147 See id. at 679.
148 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
149 Id (internal quotation marks omitted).
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B. Majority View: Per Se Rule
Since passage of the ADA in 1990, most courts have followed the
pre-ADA cases in effectively holding that HIV infection is a per se disa-
bility, often tying this determination largely to the effects of HIV infec-
tion on reproduction. For example, in Anderson v. Gus Mayer Boston
Store,150 the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Texas explicitly held that AIDS is a per se disability.15 1 Plaintiff David
Anderson had spent his entire career working for the Gus Mayer Bos-
ton Store, a women's fashion retailer, when he was diagnosed with
AIDS in July of 1991.152 Randolph Ney, the sole proprietor of Gus
Mayer, switched to a health insurance policy that denied coverage to
Anderson, ostensibly because Anderson had been treated for testicu-
lar cancer within the last ten years. 153 Anderson filed a complaint
with the EEOC, which determined that Gus Mayer violated the ADA
because it denied Anderson access to group health insurance and en-
tered into a contract that discriminated against him.154 In concluding
that Mayer discriminated against Anderson on the basis of his disabil-
ity, the court did not distinguish between symptomatic and asymptom-
atic HIV,155 even though Anderson had been diagnosed with full-
blown AIDS.156 Rather, the court recognized that HIV infection,
whether symptomatic or asymptomatic, interferes with various major
life activities, the most obvious being "the ability to procreate."'157 Fur-
ther, the court deferred to section 36.104(1) (iii) of the DOJ imple-
menting regulations, interpreting them to include both HIV infection
and AIDS within the definition of disability.158
In Doe v. Kohn Nast & Graf P.C.,15 9 the court similarly relied on
the effects of HIV infection on reproduction to extend the protec-
tions of the ADA to HIV-infected individuals. 160 The plaintiff, a lawyer
infected with HIV, complained that his former law firm violated sev-
eral state and federal statutes, including Title I of the ADA.16 1 Specifi-
150 924 F. Supp. 763 (E.D. Tex. 1996).
151 See id. at 777.
152 See id. at 769.
'53 See id. at 770.
154 See id.
155 See id. at 774-75.
156 See i& at 769.
157 Id. at 777 n.37 ("Beyond the obvious impairment on the ability to procreate, even
an asymptomatic HIV-positive individual can not travel freely. Such an individual must be
always mindful of exposure to bacterial infection and fungi or even places requiring vac-
cinations."). Although the court did not expressly couch this impairment in the ADA's
terms, as a substantial limitation of a major life activity, the obvious implication is that the
ability to travel and procreate constitute major life activities under the ADA.
158 See id at 777 n.36.
159 862 F. Supp. 1310 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
160 See id at 1321.
161 See id at 1313.
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cally, he alleged that his supervisors discriminated against him after
learning that he was infected with HIV and that they ultimately termi-
nated his employment without the ninety-day written notice required
by his contract. 6 2 In determining that the plaintiff had met his bur-
den of establishing a prima facie case of disability discrimination, the
court relied heavily on the ruling in Cain v. Hyatt.163 The court noted
the obvious impairment generated by HIV infecion-"a physical dis-
order of the hemic (blood) and lymphatic systems"164--but, like the
pre-ADA Cain court, ignored the logical conclusion that such an im-
pairment substantially limits the major life activity of fighting infec-
tion. Instead, the court felt compelled to find that an HIV-infected
individual is substantially limited in the major life activity of
procreation. 65
And yet, as in the Cain and Ryan cases, the rationale behind An-
derson v. Gus Mayer Boston Store and Doe v. Kohn, Nast & Graf P. C. fails
to realistically address the actual cause of discrimination in each case.
In Anderson, defendant Randolph Ney feared withdrawal of several
employees from his business's health insurance group if he did not
secure a plan with reduced premiums.' 66 Thus, Ney viewed Anderson
as a financial liability but never discriminated against him on any basis
related to the effects of HIV infection on Anderson's reproductive
abilities or Anderson's ability to carry out his job.
In Kohn, the court rejected plaintiffs motion for summary judg-
ment on the discrimination claim under the "regarded as" prong of
the ADA. 167 In this case, lawyers found a copy of a letter to Doe from
a doctor at Johns Hopkins University AIDS Services in the personal
file of Steven Asher, the partner for whom Anderson did the majority
of his work.' 68 Indeed, the plaintiff contended that shortly after the
firm inadvertently received this letter, "Asher stopped assigning him
work, stopped speaking with him, and avoided physical contact with
him."169 Asher's conduct, and by extension that of the entire defen-
dant firm, smacks of the very unfounded myths and fears about HIV
162 See id. at 1314-15.
163 See id at 1321.
164 Id- at 1320 (quoting Cain v. Hyatt, 734 F. Supp. 671, 679 (E.D. Pa. 1990)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
165 See i& ("It is clear, therefore, that the language of the [ADA] does not preclude
procreating as a major life activity, but may well include it.").
166 See Anderson v. Gus Mayer Boston Store, 924 F. Supp. 763, 770 (E.D. Tex. 1996).
167 See Doe, 862 F. Supp. at 1322-23.
168 See id. at 1322.
169 Id. at 1315. The only other evidence of a perception of impairment by members of
the law firm was the fact that two secretaries and a member of the support staff had over-
heard and spread rumors that plaintiff had HIV. See id at 1322. Although Asher's conduct
provides clear proof that fear of HIV influenced at least some superiors, "[r]ather than
assuming that the social stigma associated with HIV invariably sustained a finding that an
infected individual be regarded as having such an impairment, the court required that the
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and AIDS that Congress intended the "regarded as" prong of section
12102(2) to cover, especially because the decision mentions no evi-
dence that Anderson could not perform his job adequately or that he
had, for that matter, fallen from his previous high level of perform-
ance.1 70 One must then question the efficacy of a statute, or at least
its interpretation, that leads HIV-infected plaintiffs such as Doe to
claim coverage on the grounds that HIV infection irreparably impairs
their ability to produce uninfected offspring.' 71 These cases represent
an "ends justifies the means" principle, apparently content to find
HIV infection per se disabling in its effect on reproduction when that
effect is not the object of the discrimination itself. We might be happy
with the outcome of this approach, but implementing a discrimina-
tion statute in a manner that does not convey social condemnation of
the fears and prejudices that produce discrimination seems hollow at
best.
In fact, this reliance on reproductive impairment as the basis for
coverage indicates that the apparently per se rule laid down by Ander-
son and Kohn may contain certain holes. Parmet and Jackson note
that "the Kohn court was clearly unwilling to assume that HIV infec-
tion is inevitably a disability" and "insisted on tying the finding of disa-
bility to the literal language of the statute, as opposed to the social
construction of plague."'172 This statement suggests the absurd result
that an asymptomatic individual who does not find HIV to be a sub-
stantial limitation on his reproductive abilities might not fall within
the statute, unless he could prove a similar limitation of some other
major life activity.173
However, any skepticism of the Kohn court as to the inevitability
of HIV as a disability does little to erode the majority rule that HIV
infection is a per se disability. Many courts never reach the question
of what major life activity is substantially limited by HIV infection, in-
stead deferring to the DOJ and EEOC implementing regulations174 to
find that HIV infection qualifies both symptomatic and asymptomatic
individuals as disabled under the ADA. For example, in a Rehabilita-
tion Act case in which a correctional facility denied food service jobs
plaintiff show that members of the defendant law firm subjectively perceived him to be
impaired." Parmet &Jackson, supra note 1, at 31.
170 See Doe; 862 F. Supp. at 1314-15.
171 See id- at 1321. Ironically, the defense attempted to turn Anderson's asymptomatic
status against him, claiming that he could not be covered by the ADA because he was not
occupationally disabled. See i& at 1318. And yet, Asher told Anderson that the firm would
not renew his contract because his work product did not meet the firm's expectations. See
id. at 1315. Thus, one could perhaps argue that Anderson was pigeonholed into claiming
substantial impairment of reproductive abilities as the basis for ADA coverage.
172 Parmet &Jackson, supra note 1, at 31.
173 See id. at 39-40.
174 See supra Part II.A.2.
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to HIV-positive inmates, the Ninth Circuit stated that "there is no dis-
tinction to be drawn.., between those persons in whom the HIV virus
has developed into AIDS and those persons who have remained
asymptomatic."'175 Similarly, in Hoepfl v. Barlow, the court asserted
that "[i] t is now settled law that HIV-positive individuals are 'disabled'
within the meaning of the ADA."176
C. Minority View: Fourth Circuit
The Fourth Circuit rejects per se disabilities, basing its disability
jurisprudence on the theory that a determination of disability must be
made on a case-by-case basis. Forrisi v. Bowen 177 provides the point of
departure for this insistence on an individualized inquiry. In this case,
the Department of Health and Human Services fired a utility repairer
and operator because his fear of heights hindered his ability to climb
ladders and stairways in the performance of routine and emergency
maintenance. 78 Forrisi claimed protection as a handicapped individ-
ual under section 505 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.179 In holding
that Forrisi was not a handicapped individual, the court stated:
The question of who is a handicapped person under the Act is best
suited to a "case-by-case determination" as courts assess the effects
of various impairments upon varied individuals. The definitional
task cannot be accomplished merely through abstract lists and cate-
gories of impairments. The inquiry is, of necessity, an individual-
ized one-whether the particular impairment constitutes for the
particular person a significant barrier to employment.' 80
The Fourth Circuit relied heavily on this statement in Ennis v.
National Ass'n of Business and Educational Radio'81 when it determined
that the plain language of ADA section 12102 (2) demands that courts
make a finding of disability on a case-by-case basis.' 8 2 The National
Association of Business and Educational Radio (NABER) hired Joan
Ennis in 1990 as a bookkeeping clerk.183 At this time, Ennis was in the
175 Gates v. Rowland, 39 F.3d 1439, 1446 (9th Cir. 1994) (deferring to the DOJ
regulations).
176 906 F. Supp. 317, 319 n.7 (E.D. Va. 1995) (citing as support for this proposition
Howe v. Hull 873 F. Supp. 72, 78 (N.D. Ohio 1994), Gonzales v. Garner Food Services Inc., 855
F. Supp. 371, 374 n.5 (N.D. Ga. 1994), United States v. Morvant, 843 F. Supp. 1092, 1093-94
(E.D. La. 1994), and T.E.P. v. Leavitt, 840 F. Supp. 110, 111 (D. Utah 1993)).
177 794 F.2d 931 (4th Cir. 1986).
178 See id. at 933.
179 See 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994). As noted above, Congress intended courts to read the
relevant provisions of the Rehabilitation Act into the ADA, see supra note 84; therefore, the
Rehabilitation Act cases remain relevant for our purposes.
180 Forisi 794 F.2d at 933.
181 53 F.3d 55 (4th Cir. 1995).
182 See id. at 59-60 (citing Fordsi, 794 F.3d at 933).
183 See id- at 56.
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process of adopting an asymptomatic HIV-positive child. 84 Three
years later, Ennis's supervisor fired her based on an unacceptable
level of job performance. 85 Ennis filed suit, alleging discriminatory
termination due to her "known association" with her HIV-positive
son.186 She claimed that NABER's decision to fire her stemmed from
fear of the possible "catastrophic impact" that her son's illness might
have on defendant's insurance rates.'8 7 Ennis argued that her son's
HIV-positive status rendered him disabled under the ADA regardless
of whether or not he suffered from full-blown AIDS, because his
asymptomatic illness limited many of his life functions, such as play-
ing.188 However, the court found, at that stage of litigation, no evi-
dence of her son's alleged disability, much less any substantial
limitation of a major life activity that might affect his life on a daily
basis.189 Nor did the court find that her son had a record of, or was
regarded as having, an impairment that substantially limits a major life
activity under the second or third prong of section 12102 (2).190 Most
importantly, the court noted that finding her son disabled would inev-
itably force the conclusion that HIV infection is a per se disability-a
conclusion that would clearly violate the plain language of the stat-
ute.191 Thus rejecting Ennis's claim of discrimination due to associa-
tion with a disabled child, the court found that her record of poor
performance was such that no reasonable jury could find that she was
performing her job satisfactorily. 192
In Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Maryland, N.A., 193 the Fourth Cir-
cuit cited Ennis for the following two propositions: First, the determi-
nation of disability requires an individualized inquiry. Second,
asymptomatic HIV infection is not a per se disability under the
ADA. 194 Runnebaum, an employee at NationsBank, was fired by his
supervisor three months after revealing to the bank's senior managing
officer that he had asymptomatic HIV. 195 Runnebaum alleged that his
termination violated the ADA, while his supervisor contended that she
had already decided to fire him prior to learning of his HIV-positive
184 See id.
185 See id. at 57.
186 Id
187 Id.
188 See Carlis & McCabe, supra note 84, at 592-93 (citing Appellant's Opening Brief at
26 & n.29, Ennis (No. 94-1585)).
189 See Ennis, 53 F.3d at 60.
190 See id.
191 See i&d
192 See id at 62.
193 123 F.3d 156 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc).
194 See id. at 169-70.
195 See d. at 163.
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status.' 9 6 The Fourth Circuit determined that under the individual-
ized inquiry into disability, Runnebaum had to establish that asymp-
tomatic HIV constitutes a "physical or mental impairment" that
substantially limited one or more of his major life activities according
to the plain language of section 12102(2) of the ADA. 197
As to the impairment question, the majority looked to Webster's
Dictionary, which defines "impair" as to "make worse by or as if by di-
minishing in some material respect."'98 Under this definition, the
court concluded that asymptomatic HIV does not qualify as an impair-
ment because "without symptoms, there are no diminishing effects on
the individual."' 99 By extension, this logic suggests that "asymptom-
atic HIV infection will never qualify as an impairment."200 The court
again turned to Webster's Dictionary for the definition of "major" in in-
terpreting "major life activities" to mean those activities which are "rel-
atively more significant or important than other life activities." 201
Amici argued that engaging in intimate sexual relations is a major life
activity contemplated by the ADA and is substantially limited by HIV
infection.20 2 Although the court admitted that procreation is a "fun-
damental human activity," it rejected the contention that it constitutes
a major life activity under the ADA.203 Further, even assuming that
procreation and intimate sexual relations are major life activities, the
court found that asymptomatic HIV does not limit either for purposes
of the ADA.20 4 Here, the court narrowly interpreted "substantially
limits" to refer only to the major life activity in question, not an indi-
vidual's reaction to the impairment.205 For example, an HIV-infected
individual might forgo having children for fear of transmitting the
infection to those children or might abstain from sexual relations to
avoid the risk of infecting a partner.20 6 However, the court viewed
these behavioral decisions as reactions to the impairment of HIV in-
fection, not direct consequences of the impairment itself.207 Conse-
quently, the Fourth Circuit held that Runnebaum was not disabled
196 Se id
197 Id. at 167.
198 Id at 168 (quoting WEBsTER's Nm- NE CoLLEG ATE DIIoNAR 603 (1986)) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted).
199 Id
200 Id. at 169.
201 Id at 170.
202 See id.
203 Id
204 See i& at 171-72.
205 See id at 172.
206 See id.
207 See id
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under the statute, and affirmed the order of the district court grant-
ing summary judgment for NationsBank.208
Ennis and Runnebaum have already influenced judicial thought
within the circuit,20 9 partially realizing the fear that the new social
construction of HIV may lead courts to prematurely reduce disability
discrimination protection for the HIV-infected. 210 Indeed, one com-
mentator has noted that "[b]y interpreting the statutory language to
preclude protection for individuals with asymptomatic HIV, the ma-
jority opinion [in Runnebaum] flouts the ADA's 'clear and compre-
hensive national mandate' to eliminate discrimination against
individuals with disabilities."211
The Supreme Court may have laid such fears to rest in its recent
decision in Bragdon v. Abbott.2 12 Nevertheless, these Fourth Circuit
cases prove significant even if only to point out the puzzling and circu-
itous rationale used to cover asymptomatic HIV-infected individuals
under the ADA's definition of disability on the basis of a substantial
limitation of the major life activity of reproduction. Impairments of
the reproductive system seem curiously disconnected from the social
stigma that HIV infection carries and the discrimination that follows
therefrom. But since we find the reproductive system at the heart of
the debate as to whether HIV infection constitutes a per se disability,
an analysis of the case law dealing with purely reproductive disorders
as disabilities, particularly infertility, proves helpful in understanding
the split between the majority of courts and the Fourth Circuit.
208 See id at 175.
209 See Carlis & McCabe, supra note 84, at 610-13 (citing several cases). For instance, in
Cortes v. MacDonald's Corp. the court granted defendant employer's motion for summary
judgment on an employment discrimination claim filed by an asymptomatic HIV-positive
former employee. See 955 F. Supp. 541, 547 (E.D.N.C. 1996). The court deferred to the
Fourth Circuit's determination that HIV is not a per se disability, rejecting the plaintiff's
argument that HIV infection substantially limited his ability to work, not to mention any
major life activity. See id. at 545-46; see also EEOC v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Drydock
Co., 949 F. Supp. 403, 407 n.5 (E.D. Va. 1996) (acknowledging the Fourth Circuit rule that
HIV infection is not a per se disability).
210 See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying notes.
211 Recent Cases, 111 HARv. L. REv. 843, 848 (1998) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(i)
(1994)). Similarly, as noted by a lawyer for the plaintiff in the Bragdon case, the holding in
Runnebaum has "challenged a central tenet of public health policy- that HIV is a single
disease, infectious at all times, always requiring antidiscrimination protection." Wendy E.
Parmet, The Supreme Court Confronts HIV- Reflections on Bragdon v. Abbott, J.L. MED. & ETH-
ics 225, 229 (1998).
212 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
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I
INERTIrY,,AS A DisABmrry UNDER E ADA
Infertility affects approximately five million Americans, forty per-
cent of whom are women.2 13 It has been classified as "a disease, a
disorder, a disability, a handicap, an illness, a syndrome, a condi-
don,"214 and even an "epidemic."215 But for our purposes, the classifi-
cation of infertility as a "physiological disorder affecting the
reproductive system"2 1 6 proves most salient. Both the DOJ imple-
menting regulations for Tide III of the ADA and the corresponding
EEOC regulations for Tide I of the ADA define "physical or mental
impairment" as "[a] ny physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic
disfigurement, or anatomical loss," affecting various body systems in-
cluding the reproductive system.217 Consequently, infertility clearly
constitutes a physical impairment under the ADA. The judicial disa-
greement as to whether infertility is a disability thus turns on an assess-
ment of whether the physical impairment of infertility substantially
limits a major life activity. And, as with the HIV-as-disability debate,
this question depends on whether the courts consider reproduction to
be a major life activity under the ADA. The leading cases on this is-
sue, Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co. 218 and Zatarain v. WDSU Television,
Inc.,2 19 reveal the ambiguity of section 12102(2) of the ADA and the
various interpretations to which it is subject.
A. Pacourek Line
In Pacourek, the Northern District of Illinois held that infertility is
an impairment that substantially limits the major life activity of repro-
duction, thus finding an infertile woman disabled under the ADA. 220
After working at Inland Steel for over ten years, Charline Pacourek
was diagnosed as having "unexplained infertility."221 Her medical
treatments-injection of a hormone drug and intrauterine insemina-
213 See Deborah K. Dallmann, Note, The Lay View of What "Disability" Means Must Give
Way to What Congress Says It Means: Infertility as a "Disability" Under the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act; 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 371, 385-86 (1996).
214 Id. at 385 (quotingJoel N. Ephross, In Vitro Fertilization: Perspectives on Current Issues,
32 JuRimrcs J. 447, 449 (1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
215 Id. at 386 (quoting Philip Elmer-Dewitt, Making Babies, TisM, Sept. 30, 1991, at 56)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
216 Id at 394.
217 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)1) (1998); 28 G.FR. § 36.104(1)(iii) (1998); see supra Part
I.B.l.a.
218 916 F. Supp. 797 (N.D. IM. 1996).
219 881 F. Supp. 240 (E.D. La. 1995), affd 79 F.3d 1143 (5th Cir. 1996) (unpublished
table decision).
220 See Pacourek, 916 F. Supp. at 804.
221 Id. at 799.
220 [Vol. 85:189
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tion-occasionally caused her to miss work.222 Pacourek's supervisor
discovered that these treatments were responsible for her absences
and ordered her to obtain an explanatory letter from a doctor for any
further absences. 223 Her supervisor further warned that Inland Steel
might terminate her employment if her attendance did not im-
prove.224 Another superior informed Pacourek that she was consid-
ered "high risk" for termination, and approximately two months later,
Inland Steel fired her.225 After receiving her right-to-sue letter from
the EEOC, Pacourek filed suit against Inland Steel, alleging violations
of the ADA and several other federal statutes.2 26 Inland Steel moved
for partial summary judgment, claiming that Pacourek had no claim
under the ADA because "unexplained infertility" is not an impairment
and reproduction does not constitute a major life activity.2 27
The district court looked to the EEOC implementing regula-
tions2 28 for aid in interpreting section 12102(2) of the ADA.229 Be-
cause the reproductive system is one of the many "body systems" listed
by the EEOC that can be impaired for purposes of the ADA if affected
by a "physiological disorder, or condition,"230 the court concluded
that infertility easily qualifies as an impairment.2 31 The court noted
that "[i] t defies common sense to say that infertility is not a physiologi-
cal disorder or condition affecting the reproductive system" and that
"[i]n fact, infertility is the ultimate impairment of the reproductive
system."2 32
While this reasoning as to the "impairment" element of the defi-
nition of disability flows easily from the wording of the statute and the
implementing regulations, the court's rationale for finding reproduc-
tion to be a major life activity proves significantly less convincing. The
court argued that the EEOC rulemakers must have intended repro-
duction to be a major life activity.2 33 Otherwise, including the repro-
ductive system on the list of body systems that can be impaired would
be meaningless because an impairment of the reproductive system
could never substantially limit a major life activity and thus could
222 See id
223 See id.
224 See id
225 Id
226 See id
227 Id at 801.
228 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (1) (1998); supra Part II.A2.
229 See Pacourek, 916 F. Supp. at 801.
230 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (1) (1998).
231 See Pacourek, 916 F. Supp. at 801.
232 Id
233 See id at 801-02.
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never constitute a disability.234 But following this line of reasoning
leads to the impossible conclusion that all impairments under the
ADA substantially limit a major life activity and thus are automatic dis-
abilities. If so, the "substantially limits" and "major life activity" ele-
ments of the first prong of section 12102 (2) "would be superfluous"235
because all impairments under the first element would already qualify
as disabilities. Surely the EEOC did not mean to negate two thirds of
Congress's definition of disability under the first prong of section
12102(2). The court's conclusion that "the EEOC rulemakers con-
templated that reproduction may be considered a major life activ-
ity"2 3 6 therefore seems hollow at best. In fact, it is this very tortured
construction that the Louisiana district court in Zatarain v. WDSU-Tele-
vision, Inc. noted "would allow [a plaintiff] to bootstrap a finding of
substantial limitation of a major life activity on to a finding of an
impairment."23 7
After concluding that reproduction is a major life activity, the
Pacourek court quickly dispensed with the "substantially limits" ele-
ment of section 12102(2), apparently considering it a matter of com-
mon sense that infertility substantially limits the major life activity of
reproduction. 238
234 See ia The court quoted from an earlier disposition of the case, in which it noted
that "[i]f a physiological disorder affecting the reproductive system constitutes an impair-
ment under the ADA, then 'it logically flows from that instruction that reproduction is a
covered major life activity.'" Md at 801 (quoting Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 858 F. Supp.
1393, 1404 (N.D. Ill. 1994)).
The Pacourek court further supported its position with two earlier infertility cases. The
court quoted dictum from a Seventh Circuit case stating that the implementing regulations
of the Rehabilitation Act define "handicapped individuals to include any persons with a
physiological disorder affecting the reproductive system." Id. at 802 (quoting McWright v.
Alexander, 982 F.2d 222, 226-27 (7th Cir. 1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The
court also relied on Erickson v. Board of Governors, 911 F. Supp. 316 (N.D. Ill. 1995). See
Pacourek, 916 F. Supp. at 802-03. In Erickson, the court held that infertility is an impairment
of the reproductive system which substantially limits the ability to reproduce. See Erickson,
911 F. Supp. at 321. Further, the court relied on the House Report of the Committee on
Education and Labor and its discussion of ADA coverage for HIV-infected individuals, see
supra notes 105-11, to determine that Congress actually intended reproduction to be a
major life activity for purposes of the ADA. See Erickson, 911 F. Supp. at 323.
235 Theresa A. Schneider, Note, Stretching the Limits of the ADA: Asymptomatic HIV-Positive
Status as a Disability in Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998), 77 NEB. L. Ruv. 206, 218
(1998).
236 Pacourek, 916 F. Supp. at 802.
237 881 F. Supp. 240, 243 (E.D. La. 1995), affd 79 F.3d 1143 (5th Cir. 1996) (unpub-
lished table decision).
238 See Pacourek, 916 F. Supp. at 804. The same district court undertook a similar analy-
sis in Soodman v. Wildman, Harrold Allen &Dixon, No. 95-C3834, 1997 WL 106257 (N.D. Ill.
Feb. 10, 1997), relying on the Pacourek, McWrigh4 and Erickson cases to support its conclu-
sion that plaintiff's "incompetent" cervix constituted a disability under the ADA because it
was an impairment that substantially limited the major life activity of reproduction. See id.
at *2, 5-6. Unlike infertility, however, the plaintiffs condition did not fully prevent repro-
duction, but rather seriously jeopardized her ability to carry a fetus to term. See id, at *2.
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B. Zatarain Line
The Zatarain case presents a much narrower, disciplined con-
struction of section 12102(2) and the corresponding implementing
regulations. Plaintiff, Lynn Gansar Zatarain, worked as an anchor and
a reporter for WDSU-Television, Inc., pursuant to a personal services
contract scheduled to expire on November 30, 1992.239 Plaintiff
started receiving fertility treatments in July of 1992, which required
that she arrive late for work each day.240 During this time, Zatarain
and the defendant television station were negotiating her contract re-
newal. 241 In November of 1992, Zatarain told the defendant station
that her doctor recommended a four-month-long reduced work
schedule while she received the treatments.242 Shortly thereafter, de-
fendant decided not to renew Zatarain's contract.2 43 Zatarain sued
WDSU, alleging discriminatory discharge in violation of the ADA.2 44
WDSU moved for partial summary judgment, claiming that infertility
is not a disability under the ADA and that Zatarain's condition did not
substantially limit her from engaging in a major life activity under the
ADA.245
The court agreed that infertility is a physical impairment under
the ADA, concluding that Zatarain had produced sufficient expert tes-
timony regarding her reproductive disorder to preclude summary
judgment on the "impairment" element of section 12102 (2) (A) 246
However, the court rejected Zatarain's argument that reproduction is
a major life activity, holding that such a construction "would be a con-
scious expansion of the law, which is beyond the province of this
Court."
2 4 7
In response to the defendant's contention that plaintiff's condition was temporary-that
she was not completely unable to reproduce, but rather was simply impaired for the dura-
tion of her pregnancy-the court noted that plaintiff's "impairment results from a long-
standing underlying condition the effects of which continually reappear and limit her abil-
ity to bear children." Id. at *6. Further, the court pointed out that the ADA does not
require "total impairment of a major life activity" and that the major life activity of procrea-
tion encompasses more than the act of conceiving a child and bringing it to term. IdR The
parallel with HIV infection is obvious. For example, like an "incompetent cervix," HIV-
infection does not preclude reproduction but does make it very risky, at least for the un-
born child. Consequently, a court applying the Soodman line of reasoning might very well
find that HIV infection constitutes a physical impairment that substantially limits the major
life activity of reproduction.
239 See Zatarain, 881 F. Supp. at 241.
240 See ida at 241-42.
241 See id. at 242.
242 See id.
243 See i&t
244 See id.
245 See id
246 See ida at 242-43.
247 Id. at 243.
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First, the court made its "bootstrapping" argument, noting that
"the ADA and its regulations indicate that the major life activity that is
allegedly limited [should be] separate and distinct from the impair-
ment that limits it."248 In other words, just because a condition quali-
fies as an impairment under the ADA does not mean that it must
substantially limit a major life activity and thus constitute a disability.
Certainly, the very existence of two elements after the impairment ele-
ments in section 12102 (2) (A) argues persuasively for the court's inter-
pretation. But perhaps the court goes too far in requiring a strict
separation of impairment and the limited major life activity. For ex-
ample, the EEOC regulations include the "respiratory" system among
those body systems that can be impaired. 249 The regulations also list
"breathing" as a major life activity.2 50 Thus, an impairment of the re-
spiratory system could substantially limit the major life activity of
breathing. The relationship between the respiratory system and
breathing seems no less close than that between the reproductive sys-
tem and reproduction, the only difference being that the ADA and its
implementing regulations do not clearly contemplate reproduction as
a major life activity. Therefore, what the Zatarain court must have
meant is that all three elements of section 12102 (2) (A) are necessary
to the determination of disability under the ADA and that the Pacourek
court's argument for reproduction as a major life activity fails because
it infers satisfaction of the "substantially limits" and "major life activ-
ity" elements solely from satisfaction of the "impairment" element.251
The court then turned to the "frequency" argument which later
provided Justice Rehnquist with the basis for his dissent in Bragdon v.
Abbott.25 2 The Zatarain court noted that "[r] eproduction is not an ac-
tivity engaged in with the same degree of frequency as the [the EEOC
implementing regulation's] listed [major life] activities of walking,
seeing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working."25 Although an
248 Id.
249 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (1) (1998).
250 Id. § 1630.2(i).
251 See supra notes 229-37 and accompanying text.
252 See infra Part IV.C. Todd Lebowitz offers a refinement of the Zatarain test which he
refers to as the "Frequency-Universality Test." Todd Lebowitz, Note, Evaluating Purely Re-
productive Disorders Under the Americans with Disabilities Ac; 96 MIcH. L. REv. 724, 740 (1997).
Under this test, major life activities must be performed:
(1) with microfrequency: repeatedly throughout the day, if the activity is brief
in duration, or for a large portion of the day, if the activity is of longer
duration;
(2) with macrofrequency every day or nearly every day; and
(3) universally by nearly all persons, except those who are prevented from
performing the activity by an ADA-defined "impairment."
Id. at 741-42 (footnotes omitted). For Lebowitz's application of this test to reproduction as
a major life activity, see infra note 454.
253 Zatarain, 881 F. Supp. at 243.
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individual must do each of these things every day, throughout the day,
an individual need not reproduce every day or, as the court implies, at
all during his or her lifetime.254 Consequently, Zatarain was not dis-
abled under the ADA, and therefore WDSU had no duty to provide
reasonable accommodations for her infertility treatments. 2 55
In addition to illustrating the rationales for either including or
excluding reproduction from the list of major life activities under the
ADA, the infertility cases illustrate that if anything, the current HIV-as-
a-disability debate can be reduced to a question of statutory interpre-
tation. How narrowly or broadly should one construe the ADA and its
implementing regulations? Should courts consult extrinsic evidence
such as congressional reports and congressional statements reprinted
in the Congressional Record to determine what Congress "intended"
when enacting the ADA? If we view the infertility cases as companions
to the pre- and post-ADA cases interpreting HIV infection as a disabil-
ity, two basic concerns arise as crucial to an analysis of the Supreme
Court's opinion in Bragdon v. Abbott (1) what theory of statutory inter-
pretation ought to apply in interpreting the ADA; and (2) to what
extent do we desire a disability statute that not only prohibits discrimi-
nation against the HIV infected, but does so in a manner that directly
indicates society's condemnation for such discrimination?
IV
BRA GDoN v ABBoll
A. Background
Plaintiff Sidney Abbott had been HIV positive for several years
but remained asymptomatic when she arrived for an appointment at
the Bangor, Maine office of defendant Randon Bragdon, a dentist li-
censed to practice in Maine. 256 Abbott indicated on her registration
form that she had HV.2 5 7 While examining Abbott, Dr. Bragdon dis-
254 See id.
255 See id. at 243-44. In Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Medical Center, 95 F.Sd 674 (8th Cir.
1996), the Eighth Circuit relied on Zatarain, holding that the plaintiff's infertility did not
substantially limit the major life activity of reproduction. See Kraue 95 F.3d at 677. The
Eighth Circuit laid out both the frequency and bootstrapping arguments of the Zatarain
court. See id. Interestingly, here the plaintiff claimed not only that infertility limited her
ability to reproduce, but also her ability to care for others. See id. at 677. The Eighth
Circuit dispensed with both alleged major life activities together, see id., thus rejecting the
expansive definition of procreation used by the Soodman court. See supra note 238. By
refusing to include the ability to care for others, the court restricted procreation to the
physical act of reproduction, and implicitly rejected the notion that individuals are some-
how entitled to experience conception and all its consequences. See Kraue4 95 F.3d at 677.
256 SeeAbbott v. Bragdon, 912 F. Supp. 580, 584 (D. Me. 1995), affd, 107 F.3d 934 (1st
Cir. 1997), affld in part, vacated and remanded in part, 524 U.S. 624, affd, 163 F.3d 87 (lst
Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1805 (1999).
257 See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 628-29.
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covered a cavity and informed her that, pursuant to his infectious dis-
ease policy, he would not fill her cavity at his office but could do so in
a hospital setting.2 58 Dr. Bragdon quoted his standard fee for filling a
cavity, and explained that Abbott would be responsible for the addi-
tional charges for the use of hospital facilities.2 59
Abbott rejected this offer and filed suit, alleging that Dr. Brag-
don's conduct violated Title III of the ADA and parallel provisions of
the Maine Human Rights Act (MHRA), which prohibit discrimination
against individuals by operators of public accommodations on the ba-
sis of disability.260 Dr. Bragdon's office fell within Title III's definition
of a "public accommodation," which includes the "professional office
of a health care provider."26 1 Both sides moved for summary judg-
ment regarding the following two issues: "(1) whether [Abbott's]
asymptomatic HIV constitutes a disability under the statute, and (2)
whether treatment of [Abbott] in [Dr. Bragdon's] office poses a direct
threat to the health and safety of others such that [Dr. Bragdon] may
lawfully refuse such treatment [under § 12183(3) of the ADA]." 262
As to the disability issue, Abbott identified only reproduction as
the major life activity limited by her asymptomatic HIV status. 263 Spe-
cifically, she asserted that the possibility of "transmitting HIV to a po-
tential child, as well as possible harm to her own immune system,
ha[d] deterred her from having children."264 Bragdon contended
that asymptomatic HIV does not constitute a per se disability and that
Abbott had failed to produce any evidence that her condition substan-
tially limited a major life activity.2 6 5 The district court granted sum-
mary judgment for Abbott on the first issue, finding that she was
disabled under the ADA because asymptomatic HIV constitutes a
physical impairment that substantially limited her major life activity of
reproduction. 266
The district court also granted the plaintiffs motion for summary
judgment on the "direct threat" issue, holding that determination of a
"direct threat" to the health and safety of health care workers must be
made according to the "reasonable medical judgments of public
health officials" using the "current state of medical knowledge." 267
258 See id. at 629.
259 See id.
260 See id. See supra note 71 for the relevant text of ADA Subchapter III.
261 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (1994).
262 Abbott v. Bragdon, 912 F. Supp. 580, 584 (D. Me. 1995), aft'd, 107 F.3d 934 (1st
Cir. 1997), af/'d in part, vacated and remanded in part, 524 U.S. 624, aff'd 163 F.3d 87 (1st
Cir. 1998), cert. denie, 119 S. Ct. 1805 (1999).
263 See id. at 586.
264 Id
265 See id. at 585.
266 See id. at 586-87.
267 1d at 589.
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Dr. Bragdon failed to provide sufficient evidence to meet this test; he
offered only his speculation as to the existence of any threat posed by
operating on an HIV-infected patient in his office.2 68 Conversely, Ab-
bott presented the testimony of an official from the CDC, who stated
that "routine dental treatment to persons with HIV or AIDS requires
no additional procedures beyond the CDC recommendations" for
dealing with the transmission of infectious diseases.236 9
The First Circuit affirmed both rulings, 270 and the Supreme
Court granted certiorari to review the following two questions: (1)
whether asymptomatic HIV infection is a disability under the ADA and
(2) whether the First Circuit cited sufficient evidence in the record to
determine that Abbott's infection posed no direct threat to the health
and safety of Dr. Bragdon.271 Although the "direct threat" issue raises
interesting questions regarding the obligations between patients and
healthcare providers, and the protocols necessary to control the
spread of infectious diseases,272 this Note focuses only on the disability
268 See id. at 588-89.
269 Id. at 589.
270 SeeAbbottv. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 949 (1st Cir. 1997), affd, 107 F.3d 934 (1st Cir.
1997), aff'd in part, vacated and remanded in part, 524 U.S. 624, aff'd, 163 F.3d 87 (1st Cir.
1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct 1805 (1999).
271 See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 630 (1998).
272 The Supreme Court agreed with the lower courts as to the proper standard for
determining whether an infectious individual constitutes a "direct threat" to a private
health care provider under the ADA, concluding that "courts should assess the objective
reasonableness of the views of health care professionals without deferring to their individ-
ual judgments," in light of "available medical evidence." Id. at 650. In determining the
"prevailing medical consensus" regarding the threat posed by an infectious disease, courts
should give "special weight and authority" to certain public health authorities, particularly
the U.S. Public Health Service, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and the
National Institutes of Health. Id. However, the Court also admitted that a provider might
disagree with the "prevailing medical consensus" and still be vindicated under the "direct
threat" exception by producing "a credible scientific basis for deviating from the accepted
norm." Id.
The Court questioned whether Dr. Bragdon presented "evidence sufficient to raise a
triable issue of fact on the significance of the risk" of HIV infection from an HIV-positive
patient. Id at 653. First, Dr. Bragdon claimed a risk of airborne HIV transmission via spray
from high-speed dental drills and surface cooling with water. See id. But neither the study
cited by Dr. Bragdon nor his own expert witness could state conclusively that spray can
transmit HIV. See id. Second, defendant noted that the "CDC had identified seven dental
workers with possible occupational transmission of HIV," as of 1994. Id. at 653-54. How-
ever, various flaws in the methods used to compile these results led the Court to conclude
that this evidence would probably fail the objective, prevailing medical opinion test. See id.
at 654.
Nevertheless, the Court was similarly skeptical of two authorities-the 1993 CDC Den-
tistry Guidelines and the 1991 American Dental Association Policy on HIV-relied on by
Abbott as proof that the medical community does not view HIV-positive individuals as pos-
ing a significant risk during routine dental care, suggesting that the First Circuit may have
given them too much weight. See id. at 651-52. Consequently, the Court remanded the
case "to determine whether our analysis of some of the studies cited by the parties would
change [the First Circuit's] conclusion that petitioner presented neither objective evi-
dence nor a triable issue of fact on the question of risk." Id. at 655. On remand, the First
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issue in seeking to articulate the proper rationale for including indi-
viduals with asymptomatic HIV within the ADA's protection.
B. Majority Opinion
Justice Kennedy authored the majority opinion, with Justices Ste-
vens, Breyer, and Ginsburg concurring.2 73 Kennedy began his ADA
analysis of Mrs. Abbott's claim with an extensive description of HIV
and AIDS, charting the disease's course from the asymptomatic to
symptomatic stages and detailing many of its attendant complica-
dons.2 74 Because HIV immediately attacks the body's immune system
upon infection, the Court concluded that HIV infection constitutes "a
physiological disorder with a constant and detrimental effect on the
infected person's hemic and lymphatic systems."2 75 Consequently, the
Court held HIV infection to be a physical impairment "from the mo-
ment of infection."2 76
The Court then dealt with the question of whether reproduction
constitutes a major life activity under the ADA.277 Interestingly, Jus-
tice Kennedy pointed out that, although Abbott based her ADA claim
on the assertion that HIV substantially limits her only in the major life
activity of reproduction, HIV may in fact affect many other major life
activities.2 78 However, the Court's policy of addressing only the ques-
tions directly considered by the lower court precluded Kennedy from
discussing these other life activities, thus channelling the analysis to
the reproduction issue.279 The Court agreed with the First Circuit's
Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for Abbott on the "direct
threat issue." See Abbott v. Bragdon, 163 F.3d 87, 90 (1st Cir. 1998). The First Circuit
devoted most of its opinion to justifying their reliance on the 1993 CDC Dentistry Guide-
lines and the 1991 American Dental Association Policy on HIV, also noting that several
expert witness for Mrs. Abbott had testified that her cavity could have been safely filled in a
private dental office. See id. at 89. Consequently, Abbott's experts proved that the prevail-
ing medical consensus does not consider such dental treatment of asymptomatic HIV-posi-
tive individuals unduly dangerous. See id.
273 See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 628, 655-56.
274 See id. at 633-37. See supra note 12 for the Court's description of HIV and AIDS.
275 Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 637. Kennedy must have been referring here to the language
found in the DOJ and EEOC definitions of physical impairment. See 28 C.F.L
§ 36.104(1) (i) (1998); 29 C.F.R1 § 1630.2(h)(1) (1998).
276 Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 637.
277 See id. at 638-39.
278 See id. at 637 ("We have little doubt that had different parties brought the suit they
would have maintained that an HIV infection imposes substantial limitations on other ma-
jor life activities.").
279 See id And yet the mere suggestion that reproduction may not be the sole major life
activity through which the ADA can cover HIV infection begs the central question of this
Note: Is reproduction even the appropriate means for bringing H1IV infection within the
ADA's purview? Further, if other major life activities may be substantially limited by HIV,
why do most HIV-as-a-disability cases stubbornly focus only on the major life activity of
reproduction to obtain ADA coverage? See supra Part II. The preoccupation with HIV's
effects on reproduction defies common sense, especially when the truly insidious conse-
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analysis that the word "major" in section 12102 (2) (A) of the ADA indi-
cates the "significance" or "comparative importance" of such life activ-
ities and rejected Dr. Bragdon's assertion that major life activities
include only "those aspects of a person's life which have a public, eco-
nomic, or daily character."280 Because "[r]eproduction and the sex-
ual dynamics surrounding it are central to the life process itself,"281
the Court concluded that reproduction was sufficiently important to
qualify as a major life activity.28 2
Finally, the Court determined that HIV infection, even in the
asymptomatic stage, satisfies the "substantially limits" prong of the
ADA's definition of disability.2 83 Specifically, the Court found that
HIV substantially limited Abbott's ability to reproduce in two ways:
First, an HIV-infected woman imposes a significant risk of infection on
her male partner when attempting to conceive.28 4 Second, an HIV-
infected woman risks perinatal transmission (infection of her child
during gestation and childbirth). 285 Dr. Bragdon offered evidence
that the risk of perinatal transmission can be lowered to eight percent
via antiretroviral therapy, but the Court proved unwilling to rule that
such a risk is not substantially limiting as a matter of law, especially
since HIV is such a "dread and fatal disease."28 6 Furthermore, the
Court dispensed with the argument that HIV-positive status does not
literally prevent a woman from having children and therefore is not
substantially limiting, by replying that the ADA does not limit its pro-
tection to "utter inabilities. '28 7
quence of HIV infection is its effect on the victim's immune system. See supra note 12.
Justice Kennedy actually alluded to a more logical basis for providing ADA coverage to
HIV-infected individuals before going down the reproduction path when he stated that
HIV is a physiological disorder of the "infected person's hemic and lymphatic systems."
Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 637. Accordingly, we might say that HIV infection substantially limits
the major life function served by the hemic and lymphatic systems-fighting infection. See
infra Part V.C.3 for a discussion of this argument.
280 Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 638. The Court also relied on the list of major life activities
located in the Rehabilitation Act regulations to refute Dr. Bragdon's argument. See id.
(citing 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (1997) and 28 C.F.R. § 41.31(b)(2) (1997)). This list,
which includes activities such as "walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning
and working," is replicated in the DOJ's and EEOC's implementing regulations for the
ADA- 28 C.FR. §36.104(2) (1998); 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(i) (1998). The Court determined
that this list is not exhaustive and that nothing therein indicates that major life activities
must be daily, public, or economic in nature. See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 639.
281 Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 638.
282 See id.
283 See id at 647.
284 See id- at 639-40 (citing studies approximating that 20% to 25% of male partners of
HIV-positive women contract HIV).
285 See id at 640 (citing several studies indicating a variety of transmission rates ranging
from 14% to 45%).
286 Id. at 641.
287 Id
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Having addressed each element of the ADA's three-part defini-
tion of disability, the Court held that Mrs. Abbott's asymptomatic HIV
infection was a physical impairment that substantially limited her in
the major life activity of reproduction, thus qualifying her as disabled
for the purposes of the ADA antidiscrimination protection.288 At this
point, the Court declined to address the question of whether HIV in-
fection constitutes a per se disability under the ADA. 289 However, Jus-
tice Kennedy's suggestion that "the pervasive, and invariably fatal,
course of the disease" may substantially limit "major life activities of
many sorts" 290 suggests that the Court would likely view HIV infection
as a per se disability if ever presented with the question. Furthermore,
if we broadly interpret the Court's holding to be that asymptomatic
HIV infection is a disability regardless of which major life activity it
substantially limits, then by logical extension symptomatic HIV, which
is inherently more debilitating, must also be a disability. This conclu-
sion leaves unprotected by the ADA only the three-week primary (or
acute) phase of HIV infection which precedes the asymptomatic
phase.29' But if we ignore the relatively short duration of the primary
phase, then the Supreme Court's ruling effectively amounts to a per se
rule because it seems quite likely that any asymptomatic plaintiff could
reasonably point to a substantial limitation of his or her reproductive
system.
In support of its holding, the Court reviewed the relevant case
law, regulations, and legislative history dealing with HIV as a disability.
For example, the Court relied on the Kmiec memorandum from the
Office of Legal Counsel of the Department of Justice,292 which con-
cluded that the ADA extends protection to both symptomatic and
asymptomatic individuals.293 The Court also acknowledged the Kmiec
memorandum's determination that asymptomatic HIV substantially
limits the major life activities of procreation and "engaging in sexual
relations."294 The Court reasoned that several reports from the vari-
ous congressional committee hearings surrounding passage of the
ADA indicated a congressional endorsement of the positions set forth
by the Office of Legal Counsel.295 The Court stated that federal agen-
cies have supported these conclusions both before and after enact-
ment of the ADA,296 and that "[e]very court which addressed the issue
288 See id at 639.
289 See id. at 641-42.
290 it at 637.
291 For a summary on the progression of the disease, see supra note 12.
292 See supra Part IIl.
293 See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 642.
294 Id. at 643 (internal quotation marks omitted).
295 See ide at 645.
296 See ia at 643-44.
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before the ADA was enacted in July 1990. .. concluded that asymp-
tomatic HIV infection satisfied the Rehabilitation Act's definition of a
handicap. '297 Finally, the Court claimed support from the interpreta-
tion of the definition of disability in the ADA's implementing regula-
tions. 298 For instance, the DOJ regulations include "HIV infection
(symptomatic and asymptomatic)" on the list of physiological disor-
ders constituting physical impairments.2 99 Similarly, the EEOC has
concluded that "an individual who has HIV infection (including
asymptomatic HIV infection) is an individual with a disability."300
C. Dissent
ChiefJustice Rehnquist, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas and
in part by justice O'Connor, opened his dissent with the warning that
any determination of disability under the ADA must be made on an
individualized basis. 30 1 Consequently, a plaintiff should have to prove
all three elements of the ADA definition of disability,30 2 a conclusion
which clearly ignores the EEOC's statement that HIV is an inherently
substantially limiting (i.e., per se) disability.30 3 Assuming that asymp-
tomatic HIV infection is an impairment under the ADA,304 the dissent
297 Id. at 644. The Court noted that the Rehabilitation Act's "handicap" standard par-
allels the "disability" standard later implemented in the ADA, pursuant to § 12201(a) of
the ADA. Id. at 631-32. See supra note 83 for the statutory text of 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a).
Interestingly, the Court failed to mention any of the post-ADA cases holding that HIV is
not a per se disability, or as in the Runnebaum case, never a disability. See supra Part II.C.
Although this omission ignores only a minority of courts, it nevertheless weakens the ma-
jority opinion by refusing to confront the arguments against inclusion of asymptomatic
HIV within the ADA's umbrella.
298 See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 646-47.
299 Id- at 646 (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 36.104(1) (iii) (1998)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
300 Id. at 647 (quoting EEOC Interpretive Manual § 902.4(c) (1)) (internal quotation
marks omitted). The Court also cited the EEOC Interpretive Guidelines, which state:
"[I]mpairments... such as HIV infection, are inherently substantially limiting." 1d (quot-
ing Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. pt.
1630 app. A § 1630.2(j), at 347 (1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
301 See id. at 657 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Rehn-
quist paid close attention to the ADA's definition of disability, which states: "The term
'disability' means, with respect to an individual-(A) a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individuaL" 42 U.S.C.
§ 12102(2) (1994) (emphasis added), quoted in Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 657 (Rehnquist, CJ.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Rehnquist reasoned that the emphasis in the
statutory language on the word "individual" indicated that disability determinations must
be made on a case-by-case basis. See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 657.
302 See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 658 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
303 See Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 29
C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.20), at 347 (1998).
304 See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 658 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
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next argued that reproduction is not a major life activity.30 5 Rehn-
quist appears to have doubted Mrs. Abbott's sincerity in alleging that
reproduction was a major life activity for her. He noted that there was
no evidence in the record indicating that Mrs. Abbott's major life ac-
tivities included reproduction or that she even considered having chil-
dren prior to her infection with HIV.30 6 The implicit argument here
is that, assuming reproduction is a major life activity, Mrs. Abbott was
not disabled because reproduction was clearly not a major life activity
in her particular case.3 0 7
Justice Rehnquist then rejected the majority's construction of the
word "major" as "of comparative importance." He argued that the al-
ternative definition of "major" as "greater in quantity, number, or ex-
tent" is more consistent with the representative list of major life
activities contained in the regulations issued under the Rehabilitation
Act3 08 and replicated in the DOJ and EEOC implementing regula-
tions, such as "caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking,
seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working."3 0 9 In-
deed, "fundamental importance" could not be the "common thread"
linking these major life activities; 3 10 otherwise, the ADA would have to
cover decisions such as "who to marry, where to live, and how to earn
one's living," as well.3 1 ' Instead, Rehnquist tied the illustrative activi-
ties together with a variation of the Zatarain frequency test:3 12 "The
common thread is . . . that the activities are repetitively performed
and essential in the day-to-day existence of a normally functioning in-
dividual."'3 13 For Rehnquist, the word "reproduction" encompassed
not a single act, but rather "numerous discrete activities that comprise
the reproductive process." 314 While this series of activities culminat-
ing in childbirth comprises extremely important aspects of a person's
life, they lack the daily necessity of activities such as walking, breath-
ing, and seeing.315
305 See id. at 659-60 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
306 See id. at 658-59 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
307 See id. at 659 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
308 Id at 660 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing WEB-
STEm'S COLLEGIATE DIcTroNARv 702 (10th ed. 1994)).
309 28 C.F.R. § 36.104(2) (1998); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (1998). See supra Part II.A.2 for
a discussion of the DOJ and EEOC regulations regarding major life activities under the
ADA
310 Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 660 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
311 Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
312 See supra Part III.B.
313 Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 660 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
314 Id- at 658 n.2 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
315 See id. at 659 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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The dissent also relied on the "bootstrapping" argument used by
the Zatarain court31 6 to reject the contention that reproduction must
be a major life activity simply because the DOJ regulations include
physiological disorders of the reproductive system under the term
"physical impairment 31 7 As Rehnquist pointed out, "[t]here are nu-
merous disorders of the reproductive system, such as dysmenorrhea
and endometriosis, which are so painful that they limit a woman's abil-
ity to engage in major life activities such as walking and working. '318
These disorders explain why the regulations list the reproductive sys-
tem as a body system that can be impaired, without necessarily imply-
ing that reproduction itself is the major life activity that is substantially
limited.
Finally, Rehnquist argued that asymptomatic HIV does not im-
pose a substantial limitation on reproduction, even assuming that re-
production is a major life activity.319 For example, although an HIV-
positive individual risks transmitting the virus to his or her partner, or,
in the case of a woman, to her child, the decision not to engage in the
reproductive process is essentially a self-imposed limitation and not a
physical inability or even a reduced ability to reproduce.320 Similarly,
asymptomatic HIV did not substantially limit Mrs. Abbott's ability to
bear or raise her children, even if the infection meant she may not live
to see her child reach adulthood.321 In fact, basing determinations of
disability on possible future disabling events "would render every indi-
vidual with a genetic marker for some debilitating disease 'disabled'
here and now."322 Consequently, Rehnquist concluded that Mrs. Ab-
bott failed to demonstrate a substantial limitation of the major life
activity of reproduction. 323
V
RETHI-NKING HIV AS A DisABi~r
A. Appropriate Theory of Statutory Interpretation
The disagreement between the majority and the dissent in Brag-
don can be attributed largely to a difference in theories of statutory
interpretation. Since the early 1990s, the Court has proven increas-
ingly willing to ignore legislative history and other extrinsic aids-
sources outside the text of the statute-when interpreting statutes, in
316 See supra Part III.B.
317 See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 660 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
318 Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
319 See id. (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
320 See id at 660-61 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
321 See id. at 661 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
322 Id. (Rehnquist, Cj., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
323 See id (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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part through the influence ofJustice Scalia, a major proponent of the
so-called textualist approach to statutory interpretation.3 24 In a 1992
article, Stephen Breyer, then Chief Judge of the First Circuit, la-
mented this decline in the Supreme Court's use of legislative history,
forecasting that "referring to legislative history to resolve even difficult
cases may soon be the exception rather than the rule."325 Justice
Breyer joined Justice Stevens's concurring opinion in Bragdon, which
voiced a preference for an "outright affirmance" of the appellate
court but nevertheless agreed with the majority's legal analysis. 32 6
Consequently, one can viewJustices Breyer and Scalia as personifying
the interpretive split between the majority and the dissent in Brag-
don-between a desire to divine Congress's true purpose in enacting
the ADA through a review of legislative history, and a fear that such
extrinsic aids will only confuse the plain meaning of the statute.
1. A "Soft" Plain Meaning Rule Approach to the ADA
Traditionally, the Court has sought out the "original intent or
purpose of the enacting Congress" when confronted with a statute. 327
The best indicator of legislative intent is the statutory text itself, and
thus the Court typically has looked first to the plain meaning of the
statute. 328 However, applying what some refer to as a "'soft' plain
meaning rule," the Court may review the legislative history of a statute
(e.g., committee reports, statements from the floor of Congress, con-
gressional hearings, congressional committee reports, legislative inac-
tion) to elicit congressional intent,3 29 and legislative history that
strongly contradicts the plain meaning of the statute will often pre-
vail.330 In fact, the Court may go even further and engage in a full-
fledged historical documentation of the statute in order to "'recon-
324 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv. 621, 624 (1990).
325 Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L.
REV. 845, 846 (1992).
326 Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 656 (Stevens, J., concurring).
327 Eskridge, supra note 324, at 626.
328 See id
329 Id. Narrowly construed, legislative history refers to the "the institutional progress
of a bill to enactment." WiLLIAM N. ESIRIDGE,JR. & PHIUP P. FRicKEv, CASEs AND MATERALS
ON LEGISLATION: STATurES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC Pouicy 733 (2d ed. 1995).
330 See Eskridge, supra note 324, at 628-29 (citing several cases illustrative of the "soft
plain meaning rule," such as TVA v. Hill 437 U.S. 153 (1978) and Church ofthe Holy Trinity
v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892)). Eskridge repeats perhaps the best pronouncement
of the Court's theory of statutory interpretation in its own words: "[T]he circumstances of
the enactment of particular legislation may persuade a court that Congress did not intend
words of common meaning to have their literal effect." Id. at 628 (quoting Watt v. Alaska,
451 U.S. 259, 266 (1981)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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struct' the answer the enacting Congress would have given if the inter-
pretive issue had been posed directly."331
The majority in Bragdon compiled just such a body of legislative
history to supplement the text of the ADA and its implementing regu-
lations,3 32 despite some apparent concern with fidelity to the plain
meaning of the ADA's definition of disability.3 33 For example, as
noted previously,33 4 the Court consulted the following sources: the let-
ter from Surgeon General C. Everett Koop concluding both sympto-
matic and asymptomatic HIV-positive individuals are "clearly
impaired";33 5 the Kmiec memorandum issued by the Office of Legal
Counsel of the Department ofJustice, which states that the Rehabilita-
tion Act protects symptomatic and asymptomatic individuals against
discrimination by any federally funded program and that asymptom-
atic HIV substantially limits the major life activity of reproduction;336
the House Education and Labor Committee Report on the passage of
the ADA,3 37 which asserts that "a person infected with the Human Im-
munodeficiency Virus is covered under the first prong of the defini-
tion of the term 'disability' because of a substantial limitation to
procreation and intimate sexual relationships";33 8 and similar lan-
guage in the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources Re-
port.339 To this group we can also add various statements from the
floor of both houses concerning enactment of the ADA, such as the
aforementioned statement of Representative Owens: "[Both sympto-
matic and asymptomatic HIV-positive] individuals are covered under
the first prong of the definition of disability in the ADA, as individuals
who have a physical impairment that substantially limits a major life
331 Eskridge, supra note 324, at 630 (referring to this documentation as "imaginative
reconstruction"). For example, in Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-Fonesca,
480 U.S. 421 (1987), the Court considered "committee reports in both the House and
Senate, the report of the conference committee, a United Nations protocol and its hand-
book .... prior administrative practice, testimony at hearings by an assistant Attorney
General and a law professor, and academic commentary." Eskridge, supra note 324, at 631.
332 See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 642-47 (1998).
333 See id& at 638 ("As the Court of Appeals held, '[tihe plain meaning of the word
'major" denotes comparative importance'...." (quoting Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934,
939 (1st Cir. 1997)) (alteration in original)). See also id at 631 ("In construing the statute,
we are informed by interpretations of parallel definitions in previous statutes and the views
of various administrative agencies which have faced this interpretive question.").
334 See supra Part IV.B.
335 Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 642 (citing Surgeon General C. Everett Koop) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted); supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
336 See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 642; supra notes 90-101 and accompanying text.
37 See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 645; supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
338 H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.CAN. 303, 333.
339 See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 645; S. REP. No. 101-116, at 22 (1990); see also supra notes
109-10 and accompanying text.
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activity."340 Justice Breyer might justify reliance on these materials by
noting that in no sense do they constitute positive law.3 41 Rather,
courts should carefully use legislative history to help understand the
meaning of ambiguous words or phrases in a statute.3 42 A discussion
of the weight traditionally accorded various types of legislative history
will thus prove helpful in analyzing the Supreme Court's use of extrin-
sic aids in Bragdon.3 43
a. Committee Reports
Generally considered authoritative, committee reports should be
"given great weight," particularly because they represent the collective
view of the committee or subcommittee members who actually draft
most legislation.344 Although committee reports may suffer from the
same ambiguity as the statutes they discuss, 3 45 at least in this case, the
aforementioned reports clearly state what the ADA fails to mention:
the statute covers all HIV-infected individuals because they are sub-
stantially limited in the major life activity of reproduction. 346 How-
ever, critics point out that staff members who write committee reports
340 136 GONG. RIc. H4623 (daily ed. July 12, 1990) (statement of Rep. Owens); see
supra notes 110-11. Interestingly, none of the congressmen whose statements have been so
exhaustively compiled by Carlis and McCabe specify which major life activity is substantially
limited by both symptomatic and asymptomatic HIV infection. See Carlis & McCabe, supra
note 84, at 573-77. This omission in the legislative history and in the ADA itself is possibly
the result of uncertainty within Congress regarding the appropriate major life activity or
activities to which to tie ADA coverage for HIV, perhaps an ambiguity consciously inserted
as a partisan compromise, or perhaps simply the result of impassioned rhetoric and care-
less statutory draftsmanship. Nevertheless, it casts doubt on the Court's assertion that
"Congress was well aware of the position taken by OLC when enacting the ADA and in-
tended to give that position its active endorsement," Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 645, because the
Kmiec memorandum and the 1988 follow-up memorandum from Dawn E. Johnsen, see
supra notes 90-103, relied so heavily on HIV's substantial limitation of the major life activity
of reproduction to qualify asymptomatic HIV infection as a disability under the ADA.
Although the various committee reports cited above, see supra notes 104-10 and accompa-
nying text, expressly refer to reproduction as the major life activity that HIV substantially
limits, their authority is seriously challenged when contradicted by such vague statements
from the floor.
341 See Breyer, supra note 325, at 863.
342 See id. ("A judge cannot interpret the words of an ambiguous statute without look-
ing beyond its words for the words have simply ceased to provide univocal guidance to
decide the case at hand.").
343 The Surgeon General's letter and the DOJ memorandum fall within the purview of
administrative materials, and thus are discussed infra note 387.
344 ESKRIDGE & Fasc=xy, supra note 329, at 743; see also Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S.
70, 76 (1984) ("In surveying legislative history we have repeatedly stated that the authorita-
tive source for finding the Legislature's intent lies in the Committee Reports on the bill,
which 'represen[t] the considered and collective understanding of those Congressmen in-
volved in drafting and studying proposed legislation.'" (quoting Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S.
168, 186 (1969) (alteration in original)).
345 See ESKRmDGE & FRixcLt, supra note 329, at 743-44.
346 See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303,
333; supra Part lA.1.
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are subject to constant pressure by lobbyists to include language that
perhaps does not make it into the statute.347 Thus, we might wonder
whether discussion of coverage for HIV-positive individuals in the re-
ports issued by the House Education and Labor Committee, 48 the
HouseJudiciary Committee, and the Senate Committee on Labor and
Human Resources constitutes an attempt to placate certain interest
groups and not Congress's desire for a statute purposely left ambigu-
ous to provide for the broadest possible coverage.
b. Hearings and Floor Debates
Scholars and judges consider statements made during committee
hearings and floor debates much less reliable than committee re-
ports.349 The adversarial nature of the proceedings tends to compro-
mise their value as authority.350 Floor debates similarly suffer from
"sales talk," as well as the common legislative practice, of amending
remarks before publication in the Congressional Record.35' Never-
theless, in practice, courts often consider such statements with appro-
priate weight granted according to the author's expertise and his or
her ability to accurately represent the views of colleagues. 352
The large group of congressional statements concerning enact-
ment of the ADA strongly indicates that all HIV-positive individuals
are disabled for the purposes of the statute.353 However, the possibil-
ity remains that these remarks went through substantial revision prior
to publication or perhaps that they represent pandering to certain
interest groups. Interestingly, none of the statements expressly men-
tions exactly which major life activity HIV infection substantially lim-
itS.354 Perhaps this omission indicates a lack of consensus within
Congress as to the exact mechanics for covering the HIV infected,
347 See ESKRmGE & Fmcima, supra note 329, at 744.
348 See H.R- REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 51 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303,
333; H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 28 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 451; S.
REP. No. 101-116, at 22 (1990); supra Part II.A.1.
349 See ESRIDGE & FiucK=, supra note 329, at 773-75 (citing WiLuAM KEE & MoRRs
OGUL, THE AMERcIAN LEGISLATE PRoCEss 258 (5th ed. 1981)); see also Garcia, 469 U.S. at
76 n.3 ("'[T]o select casual statements from floor debates, not always distinguished for
candor or accuracy, as a basis for making up our minds what law Congress intended to
enact is to substitute ourselves for the Congress in one of its important functions.'" (quot-
ing Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 395-96 (1951) (Jackson, J.,
concurring))).
350 See EsKRIDGE & FIUCm'=, supra note 329, at 773-75.
351 Id. at 774 (citation omitted).
352 See id. at 774-75. Eskridge and Frickey cite the case of Trbovich v. United Mine Work-
ers of America, 404 U.S. 528 (1972), in which the Supreme Court relied almost exclusively
on statements made by the legislation's sponsor and drafter to interpret Title IV of the
Landrum-Griffin Act. See id.
353 See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
354 See supra note 340.
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coupled nonetheless with a desire to pass some sort of protective legis-
lation. Certainly these statements convey an immediate idealism with-
out confronting practical questions of implementation. But while we
should approach these statements carefully, Carlis and McCabe are, I
believe, quite correct in arguing that they belong to a larger body of
fairly reliable legislative history unified by the common goal of cover-
ing all HIV-infected individuals as disabled under the ADA.
3 55
2. A Textualist Approach to the ADA
In a recent case decided during the same term as Bragdon, Justice
Breyer, writing for the majority, relied heavily on (1) the history of the
drafting of the statute at issue, (2) a committee report, and (3) legisla-
tive debates.356 Justice Scalia dissented, voicing various concerns as to
this use of legislative history.3 57 Justice Scalia, the quintessential textu-
alist, believes that the Court should ignore legislative history unless
the text of the statute is "absurd on its face."358 Textualists believe
that the primary source of authority for interpreting statutes should
be the plain meaning of the statutory text, supplemented by certain
limited canons of construction. 359 While Justice Scalia would allow
"textual, or horizontal, coherence" arguments-looking to other parts
of the statute or similar statutes-to determine the meaning of an am-
biguous term, he rejects "historical, or vertical, coherence" argu-
ments-searching through the legislative history for the intent of the
enacting legislators. 360
His criticisms of the Court's traditional approach to statutory in-
terpretation focus primarily on the concerns discussed above regard-
ing committee reports and statements from congressional hearings
and floor debates. 361 For instance, Scalia argues that the proper goal
of statutory interpretation is not to determine legislative intent.
362
Even assuming that it is, the history preceding a statute's enactment
cannot provide reliable evidence of this intent because, in most cases,
there is no consensus as to the purpose of a statute.363 Further, mem-
bers of Congress do not read committee reports, so how can these
materials contain an "intent" of people who possess no knowledge of
355 See infra Part V.A.3.
356 See WiuLaMi N. ESKRIDGE ET AL., ESKRIDGE & FPicKEY's GASES AND MATERALS ON
LEGISLATION 131 (2d ed. Supp. 1998) (describingJustice Breyer's opinion for the Court in
Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998)).
357 See id. (describing Justice Scalia's dissent in the Almendarez-Torres case).
358 Eskridge, supra note 324, at 651.
359 See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 356, at 90.
360 Eskridge, supra note 324, at 655.
361 See supra Part VAL..
362 See EsKrIDGE ET AL, supra note 356, at 91.
363 See i&J
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their contents?364 Several functional advantages may also flow from
ignoring legislative history. First, the Court will not be "misled by ma-
nipulative legislative history." Second, incentives to create such his-
tory will be removed. Finally, the time and cost devoted to compiling
legislative history will be saved, leading to a more efficientjudiciary.3 65
Not surprisingly, Justice Scalia's textualist influence in the Brag-
don dissent is quite clear.3 6 6 The dissent relied only on the ADA itself,
the implementing regulations, and some relevant case law,3 67 com-
pletely ignoring the mass of legislative history utilized by the major-
ity.3 68 Whereas the majority emphasized the nonexhaustive quality of
the Rehabilitation Act's list of major life activities so as to allow inclu-
sion of reproduction as a major life activity,3 69 the dissent focused on
the unifying quality in the activities actually listed-acts essential for
daily living.370 The dissent then opted for a definition of "major" that
it considered "most consistent with the ADA's illustrative list of major
life activities."37 1 A textualist approach to the ADA thus conveniently
dispenses with almost all evidence supporting the view that reproduc-
tion is a major life activity substantially impaired by HIV.
3. A More Realistic Approach
Consider again the legislative history relied on by the Bragdon
court. 372 This is a persuasive body of material. Indeed, if we adopt
some form of the "soft" plain meaning rule and allow this legislative
history to inform our interpretation of section 12102 (2) of the ADA, it
proves nearly impossible to conclude other than that Congress clearly
intended the ADA to cover all HIV-infected individuals-the sympto-
matic because they are outwardly impaired and the asymptomatic be-
cause they are substantially limited in the major life activity of
reproduction. An argument that the effects of HIV on reproduction
do not constitute an appropriate means for qualifying the asymptom-
atic as disabled can thus only succeed if, as evidenced by the dissent in
Bragdon, the legislative history of the ADA is ignored or largely dis-
364 See id.
365 Eskridge, supra note 324, at 656.
366 See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 657-64 (1998) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
367 See id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
368 See id at 642-47.
369 See id. at 638-39 (citing 45 C.F.R. §84.3(j)(2)(ii) (1997) and 28 C.FR.
§ 41.31(b)(2) (1997)). Note that the list of major life activities located in the Rehabilita-
tion Act regulations is the same as the corresponding list in the DOJ and EEOC regulations
implementing the ADA. See 28 C.F.R § 36.104(2) (1998); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (1998).
370 See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 660 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
371 Id- (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
372 See supra Parts IV.B, V.A..
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counted. This Note could certainly achieve its goals more easily by
taking a textualist posture with respect to the ADA, yet such an ap-
proach seems naive at best. Carlis and McCabe admirably confront
any textualist opposition to the use of legislative history when inter-
preting the ADA, essentially arguing that the sheer inertia of the cir-
cumstances surrounding passage of the ADA demands that courts
look beyond this history:
[T] he problems cited by textualists are not relevant to the legislative
development of the ADA on the issue of whether asymptomatic HIV
disease was intended to be covered as a disability under the primary
statutory definition. Instead of isolated references to this issue, the
ADA's legislative history, from its introduction in 1988, through the
House and Senate committee reports, and culminating with the
statement of President Bush just prior to presentment in 1990 con-
sistently elucidates Congress's recognition and support for covering
asymptomatic HIV disease under the primary statutory definition of
disability.
Additionally, Congress's articulated rationale for not expressly
including a list of qualifying impairments in the statutory text-so
as not to limit unintentionally the broad scope of the Act's cover-
age-does not indicate sloppy congressional drafting, but instead
demonstrates wise legislative judgment in crafting the remedial civil
rights statute. 373
Of course, such debate proves somewhat academic in light of the
Supreme Court's final ruling in Bragdon. But this Note does not pro-
pose to solve the HIV-as-disability dilemma solely by adopting one
method of statutory interpretation over another. Instead, it assumes
that any change in the rationale for covering both symptomatic and
asymptomatic HIV-positive individuals under the ADA is ultimately a
question of public policy for Congress and the administrative agencies
responsible for implementing the ADA, rather than an issue that the
interpretive powers of the courts should solve. Further, this Note does
not seek a drastic reduction in the current level of ADA coverage for
HIV-positive individuals. The argument offered here is simply that
courts should tie such coverage not to reproduction, but to the direct
consequence of HIV infection: an impairment of the immune system.
What we can perhaps take from the textualist approach is an apprecia-
tion for a cautious approach to legislative history, as well as the need
to engage in a disciplined analysis of the text of both the ADA and its
interpreting regulations.
373 Garlis & McCabe, supra note 84, at 578 n.100 (internal citations omitted).
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4. Judicial Deference to Administrative Regulations and
Interpretations
In Bragdon, the Supreme Court relied heavily on the Rehabilita-
tion Act regulations concerning handicapped persons3 74 and major
life activities,3 75 pursuant to the ADA's command that "nothing in this
chapter shall be construed to apply a lesser standard than the stan-
dards applied under title V of the Rehabilitation Act."376 However,
the ADA regulations on disability track those of the Rehabilitation Act
almost verbatim and consequently provide a more relevant means for
interpreting the ADA definition of disability. Although the ADA spe-
cifically authorizes the DOJ and EEOC to formulate implementing
regulations, 77 it does not provide for the guidelines and interpretive
rules that follow both sets of regulations. 378 The DOJ regulations
track those promulgated by the EEOC but add "HIV disease (whether
symptomatic or asymptomatic)" to the illustrative list of physical im-
pairments. 379 Beyond this reference, neither set of regulations men-
tions HIV or AIDS. Only the EEOC interpretive guidelines assert that
"[o] ther impairments ... such as HIV infection, are inherently sub-
stantially limiting."380 Thus, the EEOC guidelines provide strong sup-
port for the argument that the ADA covers asymptomatic individuals,
although without articulating by what means such coverage is
achieved. Consequently, a review ofjudicial deference toward admin-
istrative regulations is needed to determine the proper weight to af-
ford these administrative pronouncements.
a. Legislative Rules
Legislative rules, such as the DOJ and EEOC regulations, possess
four distinguishing characteristics. 38' First, legislative rules are bind-
ing like statutes.382 Second, section 553 of the Administrative Proce-
dure Act (APA) requires a notice-and-comment period before an
374 See 45 C.F.R. § 84.30) (1) (1998).
375 See id. § 84.3(j) (2) (ii).
376 Bragdor, 524 U.S. at 631-32 (1998) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12201 (a) (1994)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
377 See supra note 40.
378 See Preamble to Regulation on Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability by Pub-
lic Accommodations and in Public Commercial Facilities, 28 C.F.R. pt. 36 app. B §36.104,
at 579 (1998); Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 29
C.F.R1 pt. 1630 app. §1630.2(j), at 345 (1998).
379 28 C.F.R. § 36.104(1) (iii) (1998).
380 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(j), at 347.
381 See l KENN=T CuLP DAVIS &R cHARDJ. PiERcE, JR., ADmNISrRAT LAW TREATISE
§ 6.3, at 233-34 (3d ed. 1994).
382 See id,
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agency may adopt legislative rules.38 3 Third, an agency can "issue
binding legislative rules only if... Congress has authorize [d] it to do
so."384 In sections 12182(b) and 12116, the ADA authorizes the DOJ
and the EEOC to issue such rules.3 8 5 Finally, "a legislative rule can
impose distinct obligations on members of the public in addition to
those imposed by statute, as long as the rule is within the scope of
rulemaking authority conferred on the agency by statute."38 6
The Supreme Court set forth its test for determining the requisite
degree ofjudicial deference to legislative rules in Chevron U.S.A., Inc.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.38 7 Under Chevron, a court re-
viewing an agency's construction of a statute via regulations conducts
a two-step analysis.3 8 8 First, the court must ask if Congress has specifi-
cally addressed the question at issue in the relevant statute; if so, the
statutory text prevails. 3 89 If not, or if the statute is ambiguous, the
court must determine whether the agency's interpretation constitutes
a "permissible construction of the statute." 390 Regulations promul-
gated through an agency's "permissible construction" of a statutory
provision are binding on the courts3 91 unless "they are arbitrary, capri-
383 See itZ at 234. The APA provides for notice of both formal and informal administra-
tive rulemaking- "General notice of proposed rule making shall be published in the Fed-
eral Register .... " 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1994). The Act also requires a comment period:
"After notice required by this section, the agency shall give interested persons an opportu-
nity to participate in the rule making through submission of written data, views, or argu-
ments with or without opportunity for oral presentation." Id. § 553(c).
384 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 381, § 6.3, at 234.
385 See supra note 40.
386 1 DAVIs & PIERCE, supra note 381, § 6.3, at 234.
387 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Davis and Pierce argue that Chevron applies only to legislative
rules, not to other, less formal agency statements such as "manuals, letters, guidelines,
interpretive rules, or litigating positions." 1 DAVIs & PIERCE, supra note 381, § 3.5, at 119.
The letter from Surgeon General C. Everett Koop, supra note 85, and the DOJ's Kmiec
memorandum, supra note 90, which constitutes a litigating position, should thus not be
binding on the courts. Similarly, the EEOC Compliance Manual does not have the force of
law.
388 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. The Court articulated the two-step test as follows:
First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the
precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end
of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court deter-
mines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the
court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would
be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if
the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the ques-
tion for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
389 See id.
390 1& at 843.
391 1 DAvis & PIERCE, supra note 381, § 6.3, at 235 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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cious, or manifestly contrary to the statute."392 This test illustrates the
Court's acknowledgement that an agency must have the power to fill
in any gaps left in the statute by Congress if it is to exercise its dele-
gated powers and administer congressional programs effectively.393
The Court also noted that a reasonable administrative construction
may survive the two-step test, even if legislative delegation to the
agency is implicit rather than explicit.3 94
Carlis and McCabe rely on this statement to contend that while
the ADA does not explicitly delegate authority to the EEOC and the
DOJ to interpret the statute's three-prong definition of disability, it
nevertheless does so implicitly by means of the "gap-filling" power.395
However, the text of the ADA sections on delegation of authority sug-
gests otherwise. Section 12116 orders the EEOC to "issue regulations
in an accessible format to carry out this subchapter in accordance with
subchapter 1 [Employment] of chapter 5 of title 5,"396 and the DOJ
delegation contains similar language regarding public accommoda-
tions.397 These delegations specifically authorize the DOJ and EEOC
to promulgate rules that interpret their respective subchapters as well
as those terms that apply to all the subchapters of the ADA, such as
the term "disability." Consequently, we have an express delegation
from Congress authorizing the DOJ and EEOC to implement regula-
tions, though no explicit authorization to adopt interpretive rules and
guidelines.
Under the first step of the Chevron test, the ADA proves decidedly
ambiguous as to the meaning of several words contained in the defini-
tion of disability. Earlier sections of this Note, for example, indicate
that terms such as "impairment," "major life activities," and "substan-
tially limits," all require further explanation. 398 Turning to step two,
we must ask whether the DOJ and EEOC regulations constitute rea-
sonable or arbitrary constructions of the ADA. The aforementioned
tools of statutory construction can be helpful in making this reasona-
bleness determination, although the Supreme Court's application of
interpretive tools in Chevron-based analyses has proven somewhat con-
392 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
393 See id. at 843 ("'The power of an administrative agency to administer a congressio-
nally created... program necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the making of
rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress.'" (alteration in original)
(quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974))). The Court also noted that "[i]f
Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of
authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation." Id. at
843-44.
394 See id. at 844.
395 See Carlis & McCabe, supra note 84, at 568.
396 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (1994).
397 See id § 12186(b).
398 See supra Part I.B.
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fusing.39 9 Here, however, the overwhelming body of legislative history
dealing with HIV as a disability strongly supports the apparently sensi-
ble rule set forth by both the DOJ and EEOC implementing regula-
tions that the "hemic and lymphatic" systems constitute body systems
that can be impaired, 40 0 and the DOJ's additional assertion that "HIV
disease (whether symptomatic or asymptomatic)" is a physical impair-
ment.401 Similarly, it seems completely reasonable for both agencies
to establish a list of major life activities because the ADA provides
none.
402
b. Interpretive Rules
Interpretive rules lack each of the four major characteristics of
legislative rules. 4 3 They are not binding on the courts or the pub-
lic. 40 4 The APA does not require a notice and comment period in the
formulation of interpretive rules, and agencies can issue interpretive
rules without an express delegation from Congress.4° 5 Finally, inter-
pretive rules cannot create new rights and duties beyond those "fairly
attributable to Congress through the process of statutory
interpretation."406
Although interpretive rules, such as the DOJ's Preamble to Regu-
lation on Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability by Public Ac-
commodations and in Commercial Facilities407 and the EEOC's
Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans with Disabilities
ACt,40 8 provide useful insight into how an agency will construe its own
399 See 1 DAvis & PIERCE, supra note 381, § 3.6, at 123-31. For example, the Court has
disagreed on whether to apply the "traditional tools of statutory construction" when review-
ing an agency's interpretation of a delegated statute. It. at 126-27 (describing the Court's
split on this issue in KMart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281 (1988)). Interestingly, some
commentators argue that "textualism triumphant would lead to a permanent subordina-
tion of the Chevron doctrine," by effectively reading out step two of the analysis. Thomas
W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WAsH. U. L.Q. 351, 371-72
(1994). For a strict textualist, it is the rare statute that proves too ambiguous to offer some
sort of reasonable interpretation. Consider Justice Scalia's statement:
One who finds more often (as I do) that the meaning of a statute is apparent
from its text and from its relationship with other laws, thereby finds /ess
often that the triggering requirement for Cheron deference exists. It is
thus relatively rare that Chevron will require me to accept an interpretation
which, though reasonable, I would not personally adopt.
Hon. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DuxE L.J.
511, 521.
400 28 C.F.R. § 36.104(1) (i) (1998); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1) (1998).
401 28 C.F.R. § 36.104(1) (iii).
402 See 28 C.F.R. § 36.104(2); 29 C.F.R, § 1630.2(i); supra Part I.B.I.c.
403 See supra notes 381-86 and accompanying text.
404 See 1 DAviS & PiERcE, supra note 381, § 6.3, at 233-34.
405 See it at 234.
406 Id
407 28 C.F.R. pt. 36 app. B, at 579 (1998).
408 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app., at 345 (1998).
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regulations, Professor Robert A. Anthony argues that interpretive
rules should never be binding.40 9 But even so, he admits that "the
status conferred on an agency as the delegate of Congress and by its
expertise often leads courts to defer to the agency's interpretation of
its governing statute."4 10 Indeed, Davis and Pierce note that courts
often find interpretive rules highly persuasive and give them binding
effect. 4 11 Furthermore, Davis and Pierce state that an agency's inter-
pretation of its own statutorily mandated regulations "is controlling
unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation."4 12 The
Supreme Court articulated this rule in Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand
Co.,4 13 reasoning that agencies are in the best position to interpret
their own rules.4 14 More recently, the Court reaffirmed the Bowles
rule in Stinson v. United States,4 15 holding that the "commentary in the
Guidelines Manual" of the United States Sentencing Commission
binds the courts "unless it violates the Constitution or a federal stat-
ute, or is inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous reading of, that
guideline."4
16
It thus appears clear that the DOJ and EEOC interpretive rules
provide highly persuasive, if not controlling, authority as to the
proper definition of disability. Yet the EEOC's claim that certain im-
409 See Robert A. Anthony, Which Agency Interpretations Should Bind Citizens and the
Courts? , 7 YALEJ. ON REG. 1, 55 (1990).
410 Id. (quoting National Latino Media Coalition v. FCC, 816 F.2d 785, 788 (D.C. Cir.
1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
411 See 1 DAVIs & PIERCE, supra note 381, § 6.3, at 241-42. Factors in favor of persuasive-
ness include "a contemporaneous and long-continued construction" by an agency and
"congressional reenactment of a statute after an agency has interpreted it." Id. at 244-45.
Incorporation of the Rehabilitation Act's definition of "handicapped persons" into the
ADA's definition of"disability" is somewhat analogous to this notion of congressional reen-
actment. In fact, the Court in Bragdon used this repetition of the Rehabilitation Act's lan-
guage to open the door to consideration of the pre-ADA cases holding that HIV infection
is a disability, as well as the relevant Rehabilitation Act regulations. See Bragdon v. Abbott,
524 U.S. 624, 631 (1998) . For instance, the Court noted that "It]he ADA's definition of
disability is drawn almost verbatim from the definition of 'handicapped individual' in-
cluded in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973," id., and later stated that "[e]very court which
addressed the issue before the ADA was enacted inJuly 1990 ... concluded that asymptom-
atic HIV infection satisfied the Rehabilitation Act's definition of a handicap," id. at 644.
412 1 DAVIs & PIERCE, supra note 381, § 6.10, at 281.
413 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945); see also Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965) ("When
the construction of an administrative regulation rather than a statute is in issue, deference
is even more dearly in order.").
414 See 1 DAviS & PIERCE, supra note 381, § 6.10, at 282.
415 508 U.S. 36 (1993). Regarding the Stinson opinion, it has been noted that "[t]he
Court has never used such strong and unequivocal language to suggest that courts would
be bound in their own functions by an administrative agency's official explanation of a rule
it had adopted." PE-rER L. STRAuss Er A., GELLHORN AND BYSE's ADMimSrRATrVE LAw:
CASES AND CoMMmrs 63 (9th ed. 1995).
416 Stinson, 508 U.S. at 38.
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pairments such as HIV are inherently disabling417 sets forth a per se
rule that conflicts with the three-part definition of disability in section
12102(2) (A) of the ADA. 418 Perhaps then, the EEOC interpretive
rules fail the Stinson test because they violate a federal statute. 419 Con-
versely, the EEOC interpretive rules note that the list of major life
activities in its corresponding regulations is "not exhaustive." 420 Be-
cause section 12102(2) of the ADA makes no attempt to qualify the
words "major life activity," it would be difficult to say that the interpre-
tive guidelines "violate" the statute. However, this interpretation, like
the dissent's textualist analysis in Bragdon, feels wooden and oversim-
plified. If we trust the ADA's legislative history, particularly the House
Education and Labor Committee Report, which states that "a person
infected with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus is covered under
the first prong of the definition of the term 'disability' because of a
substantial limitation to procreation and intimate sexual relation-
ships,"'421 then the EEOC per se rule seems more consistent with the
statute than the initial inspection might reveal.
Interestingly, however, the Stinson decision also echoes the hold-
ing of Bowles that a court can reject an agency interpretation of its own
regulations that is "plainly erroneous." 422 Scholars point out that the
"plainly erroneous" standard is far from clear,423 but as such, it opens
the door for criticism of the EEOC guidelines which state that HIV is
per se substantially limiting. Even without challenging the basic con-
gressional intent to guarantee protection against discrimination for all
HIV-infected individuals, the EEOC's implementation of that intent in
the form of a per se rule remains vulnerable. One can imagine an
417 See Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 29
C.F.1R pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(j), at 347 (1998).
418 For a discussion of the ADA's definition of disability, see supra Part I.B.1.
419 Cf Coghlan v. HJ. Heinz Co., 851 F. Supp. 808, 813 (N.D. Tex. 1994) (holding that
the EEOC's assertion in its interpretive guidelines that an insulin-dependant diabetic is per
se disabled is inconsistent with the ADA's three-part definition of disability). The district
court argued that an insulin-dependant diabetic could perform major life activities if he or
she took insulin and thus would not be substantially limited. See id. Consequently, a per se
rule would effectively operate to read out the "substantially limits" element of the ADA's
definition of disability. See id
420 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(i), at 347.
421 H.R REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 334.
422 Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 45 (1993) (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock
& Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 1 DAvis
& PIERCE, supra note 381, § 6.10, at 281 (discussing Bowes). In Thomas Jefferson University v.
Shalala, 512 U.S. 504 (1994) (5-4 decision), the Supreme Court stated:
[T] he agency's interpretation must be given "'controlling weight unless it is
plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.'" In other words, we
must defer to the Secretary's interpretation unless an "alternative reading is
compelled by the regulation's plain language or by other indications of the
Secretary's intent at the time of the regulation's promulgation."
Id. at 512 (citations omitted).
423 See 1 DAvis & PIERCE, supra note 381, § 6.10, at 284-86.
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HIV-positive individual who experiences no physical impairment in
his or her daily life because the individual is asymptomatic. Further,
suppose that this person does not experience discriminatory treat-
ment from an employer, health care provider, or anyone else, either
because they do not know of the individual's infection or, as we might
hope, because they simply do not harbor any of the "accumulated
myths and fears" about HIV which still pervade our society.424 What
reason justifies the costs in terms of federal funds, clogging of the
federal courts with frivolous discrimination cases, and possible insur-
ance consequences for employers,425 that classifying such an individ-
424 School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987).
425 For example, section 12201(c) of the ADA creates a safe harbor for insurance plans
calculating rates on the basis of the greater risks presented by disabled beneficiaries. See
CLARK C. HAVIGHURST ET AL., HEALTH CARE LAW xAND PoLIcY 189 (2d ed. 1998). Section
12201(c) provides that:
[The Act] shall not be construed to prohibit or restrict-
(1) an insurer, hospital or medical service company, health mainte-
nance organization, or any agent, or entity that administers benefit plans,
or similar organizations from underwriting risks, classifying risks, or ad-
ministering such risks that are based on or not inconsistent with State law;
or
(2) a person or organization covered by this chapter from establish-
ing, sponsoring, observing or administering the terms of a bona fide bene-
fit plan... ; or
(3) a person or organization covered by this chapter from establish-
ing, sponsoring, observing or administering the terms of a bona fide bene-
fit plan that is not subject to State laws that regulate insurance.
Paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) shall not be used as a subterfuge to evade the
purposes of subchapter[s] I and III of this chapter.
42 U.S.C. § 12201(c) (1994) (footnote omitted). Consequently, an employer who buys
health insurance for his employees may face higher costs if he employs asymptomatic indi-
viduals, and the insurer then charges higher premiums because these individuals are
termed "disabled" under the ADA. This prompts the question of whether the employer
pays for these costs out of employee wages. The President's Council of Economic Advisers
suggests that, in general, they do:
A firm's cost of health insurance must be passed along to someone-cus-
tomers, owners, employees, suppliers, or some combination of these
groups. In most cases, employers are constrained in their ability to pass
along these costs to their customers, owners, and suppliers. In general,
when health insurance costs rise, firms must raise the cash component of
wages less than they would otherwise in order to meet the higher health
insurance costs. Between 1973 and 1989, employer's contributions to
health insurance absorbed more than one-half of worker's real gains in
compensation. Much of the growth in compensation reported for the
1980s took the form of higher health insurance premiums.
JUDrrH AREEN ET AL., LAW, SCIENCE, AND MEDICINE 705 (2d ed. 1996) (quoting Council of
Economic Advisors, Economic Report of the President Transmitted to Congress January
1993, at 124-127 (1993)). Additionally, employers who self-insure can take advantage of an
unfortunate "gap" in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) and thus cap
health insurance for HIV-positive employees. See, e.g., Nancy Mansfield et al., Insurance
Caps on AIDS-Related Healthcare Costs: Will the ADA Fill the Gap Created by ERISA ?, 14 GA. ST.
U. L. REv. 601 (1998); see also McGann v. H & H Music Co., 946 F.2d 401 (1992) (holding
that ERISA's anti-discrimination provision does not prohibit a self-insured employer from
distinguishing among categories of disease, such as AIDS, in providing health benefits).
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ual as disabled may entail? The answer must clearly be none; this
individual is not suffering from a reduced quality of life, aside from
the emotional burden of HIV, which, while incontestably horrible,
falls outside the scope of government protection. Instead, courts can
more efficiently protect the asymptomatic by offering protection on a
case-by-case basis.
Interestingly, however, interpretive guidelines issued by the
EEOC may deserve substantial deference even if arguably inconsistent
with a federal statute. Professor Rebecca Harmer White argues that
Congress has implicitly granted the EEOC interpretive authority
under the ADA beyond its explicit authority to adopt legislative rules
implementing the statute. 426 White finds EEOC interpretive guide-
lines particularly authoritative, because "[s]ince the mid-1970s, follow-
ing the Court's pointed hint in Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, the
EEOC has issued its interpretive guidelines only after following notice
and comment procedures and sometimes after public hearings. '427
She notes that these procedures satisfy the "political-accountability
goal" of Chevron, thereby entitling the guidelines to the benefits of the
deferential standard of review under step two of Chevron.428 An exami-
nation of the EEOC's Notice of Proposed Rulemakinge 9 regarding
the creation of the regulations codified in part 1630 of 29 C.F.R. and
the publication of its Final Rule430 reveals that the EEOC issued its
interpretive guidelines along with part 1630, subjecting both to no-
tice-and-comment procedures. 43 1 Consequently, a strong argument
For a description of the difficulties faced by persons with AIDS and HIV in obtaining pri-
vate insurance, and the inadequacies of such insurance, see KAREN DAVIs ET AL., NATIONAL
COMM'N ON AIDS, FINANCING H.ALTH CARE FOR PERSONS WrrH HIV DISEASE: POLCY OP-
TIONS 15-17 (1991). Then, we might ask whether asymptomatic employees really would
choose to take the pay reduction or even possible loss of health insurance altogether in
return for their "disabled" status? If not, the Supreme Court's ruling in Bragdon creates
economic inefficiencies because asymptomatic individuals are paying for a statutory protec-
tion that they do not need-they are, in effect, getting nothing for something. If, instead,
we grant asymptomatic individuals protection only when they actually suffer discrimination
by invoking the "regarded as" prong of section 12102(2), then society can defer these costs,
assuming they exist, until they actually procure a benefit.
426 See Rebecca Hanner White, The EEOC, the Courts, and Employment Discrimination Pol-
icy: Recognizing the Agency's Leading Role in Statutory Interpretation, 1 UTAH L. REV. 51, 89
(1995).
427 Id. at 103 (footnotes omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
428 Id. at 104.
429 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 56 Fed. Reg. 8578 (1991).
430 Final Rule, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,726 (1991).
431 See Final Rule, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,726 (1991), which states:
The Commission is also issuing interpretive guidance concurrently
with the issuance of part 1630 .... Therefore, part 1630 is accompanied by
an appendix.
To assist us in the development of this guidance, the Commission re-
quested -comment in the [notice of proposed rulemaking] from disability
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can be made for giving the EEOC guidelines controlling weight when
determining a disability under the ADA.
Unfortunately, the DOJ's Notice of Proposed Rulemaking43 2 and
Final Rule 43 3 for part 36 of 38 C.F.R. dealing with title Ill of the ADA
(public accommodations) contain no such similar reference to its par-
allel interpretive guidelines. Despite this omission, a number of fac-
tors suggest that the guidelines merit judicial deference. First, the
subheading of the DOJ guidelines is entitled "Section-by-Section Anal-
ysis and Response to Comments,"434 indicating that the DOJ issued
the guidelines only in response to the same notice-and-comment pro-
cedure afforded the DOJ regulations. Second, the close connection
between the guidelines and the DOJ regulations, which are them-
selves subject to the APA's procedural requirements, may be enough
to clothe these interpretive rules with a legitimacy similar to that of
the EEOC guidelines. The DOJ preamble to part 36 therefore likely
merits substantial judicial deference.
Delving through this morass of legislative history and administra-
tive regulations is an intimidating prospect to say the least. The above
attempt only scratches the surface; however, a few general principles
emerge from the mass of information: (1) Congress dearly intended
the ADA to protect HIV-infected individuals, whether symptomatic or
asymptomatic, from discrimination; (2) the ADA's implementing reg-
ulations reasonably construe the statute; and (3) the EEOC's interpre-
tive guidelines perhaps go beyond the ADA's literal language in
rights organizations, employers, unions, [and] state agencies concerned
with employment or workers compensation practices. . . . Many corn-
menters responded to these questions.... The Commission has consid-
ered these comments in the development of the final rule and will continue
to consider them as it develops further ADA guidance.
Id.; accord Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 56 Fed. Reg. 8578 (1991); see also Wilson v.
Pennsylvania State Police Dep't, 964 F. Supp. 898, 902-03 n.4 (E.D. Pa. 1997) ("[It appears
that the guidelines [to part 1630] were subject to public notice and comment procedures
similar to those which normally apply to regulations. Thus, the guidelines arguably have
more force than would an ordinary interpretive rule." (citations omitted)). But see Wash-
ington v. HCA Health Services of Texas, Inc., 152 F.3d 464 (5th Cir. 1998), vacated, 119 S. Ct
2388 (1999), in which the court stated:
Because the EEOC's Interpretive Guidelines [to part 1630] are not only not
promulgated pursuant to any delegated authority to define statutory terms
or the like but are also not subject to the notice and comment procedure
like regulations are, they are not entitled to the high degree of deference
that is accorded to regulations under the Chevron doctrine, but the inter-
pretations are given some deference.
Id. at 469-70 (footnote omitted).
432 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 56 Fed. Reg. 7452 (1991).
433 Final Rule, 56 Fed. Reg. 35544 (1991).
434 Preamble to Regulation on Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability by Public
Accommodations and in Public Commercial Facilities, 28 C.F.R. pt. 36 app. B, at 579
(1998).
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declaring HIV a per se disability, but nonetheless deserve a high,
though difficult to determine, degree of deference.
B. Substantial Physical Impairment of Reproduction Should Not
Provide the Basis for Making HIV Infection a Per Se
Disability
Accepting that Congress intended to protect all HIV-infected in-
dividuals via the ADA, it is interesting to note that focusing on repro-
duction as the means for bringing asymptomatic HIV-positive
individuals within the ADA may actually exclude many such individu-
als from coverage. For example, Elizabeth C. Chambers argues that
under a reproduction-based scheme, "women who have gone through
menopause, young children, infertile people, or individuals who sim-
ply do not desire to have children would not be entitled to ADA pro-
tection."43 5 She contends that arbitrarily drawing the line at those
asymptomatic individuals who, like Mrs. Abbott, allege a substantial
impairment of their ability to reproduce conflicts with the ADA's ex-
press purpose of preventing unequal treatment of disabled individuals
based on characteristics and stereotypes beyond their control.43 6 Sim-
ilarly, Parmet and Jackson suggest that the "reproductive intentions"
standard leads to situations in which "the fate of many individuals who
cannot show that their HIV status had caused them to alter their
childbearing plans will be uncertain."43 7
Bragdon partially addresses these concerns through Justice Ken-
nedy's vague suggestion that HIV infection may substantially limit
"other major life activities." 438 But this hypothesizing does not neces-
sarily indicate that the Court would be willing to establish a per se rule
regarding HV. Rather, the logical extension ofJustice Kennedy's ar-
gument is a framework in which asymptomatic individuals can only
receive coverage if they successfully place themselves into one of a
handful of judicially created, major life activity pigeonholes. Cer-
tainly, this scheme neither provides the universal coverage contem-
plated by Congress, nor addresses the true issue faced in each of the
asymptomatic HIV-as-a-disability cases analyzed above.
Recall that in Thomas v. Atascadero Unified School District,43 9 the
real issue was not the limiting effects of HIV on the future reproduc-
tive abilities of a six-year-old boy, but rather the fear with which the
435 Chambers, supra note 19, at 423.
436 See i&
437 Parmet &Jackson, supra note 1, at 35. The authors give a hypothetical example of
the ironic consequences of a reproduction-based test, in which a health care provider
could discriminate against a woman who became infected with HIV after menopause, but
not against one who was infected prior to menopause. See id
438 Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 637 (1998).
439 662 F. Supp. 376 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
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school district regarded Thomas and from which his discriminatory
treatment flowed.440 Similarly, in Cain v. Hyatt,441 Cain's colleagues
discriminated against him because they feared his infection would im-
pair his job performance. 44 2 And, in the Bragdon case itself, the true
wrong committed by Dr. Bragdon against Mrs. Abbott bore no rela-
tionship to the effects of HIV on her reproductive system.443 Because
the medical community did not share Dr. Bragdon's concerns about
HIV transmission in the dental workplace, we can say that he discrimi-
nated against Abbott due to the same "accumulated myths and fears"
whose validity lies at the center of the Thomas and Cain cases, as well as
the post-ADA cases.444 Thus, those who object to the limiting aspects
of a "reproductive-intentions" standard have also pointed out the ab-
surdity of reading the ADA to offer plaintiffs a reproduction loophole,
thereby avoiding the real problem of HIV-based discrimination.445
1. Reproduction Is Not a Major Life Activity
Given the weakness of the "reproductive-intentions" standard, the
ADA should require a more rational mechanism to cover asymptom-
atic HIV-positive individuals. In rejecting reproduction as a major life
activity, however, several hurdles must be crossed.
a. Reproduction Does Not Fall Within the Scope of the DOJ and
EEOC List of Major Life Activities
Use of the words "such as" to introduce the illustrative list of ma-
jor life activities in the DOJ and EEOC implementing regulations446
indicates that both agencies contemplated the existence of further,
440 See supra Part ILA.3.
441 734 F. Supp. 671 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
442 See supra Part HA3.
443 Zita Lazzarini, Director of Medical Humanities, Health Law and Ethics at the Uni-
versity of Connecticut Health Center, argues that the Bragdon Court's emphasis on the
medical fact that HIV affects the immune system at every stage of the disease is misplaced.
See Zita Lazzarini, The Americans with Disabilities Act After Bragdon v. Abbott: HIV Infection,
Other Disabilities, and Access to Care Hum. RTs., Fall 1998, at 15, 18 (1998) ("[T]his [medi-
cal] analysis... may have obscured a more fundamental point-the discrimination Sydney
Abbott faced had more to do with prejudice and fear than with the nature and level of her
disability or scientific and epidemiological evidence of the risk she posed to Dr. Bragdon
and his staff.").
444 See supra Part II.B.
445 See Parnet &Jackson, supra note 1, at 35-36 ("[T]he protection for asymptomatic
HIV-positive individuals might be quite haphazard at best and depends on a circum-
stance-the plaintiff's fertility and reproductive intentions-that really has nothing to do with
the discrimination at issue." (emphasis added)); Chambers, supra note 19, at 422-23
("[Flocusing on reproduction and sexual activity arbitrarily distinguishes between individ-
uals based on circumstances (the plaintiff's fertility and reproductive intentions) that have
nothing to do with the discrimination at issue" (emphasis added)).
446 28 C.F.R. § 36.104(2) (1998); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (1998).
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but at the time unidentified, major life activities. 447 Although the in-
terpretive guidelines that follow the EEOC's ADA-mandated regula-
tions are somewhat doubtful,448 they confirm this suspicion, stating
that "[t] his list is not intended to be exhaustive."449 In Bragdon, the
Supreme Court interpreted this declaration of non-exclusivity to
mean that significance alone was the unifying characteristic among
qualifying major life activities.450 But it does not necessarily follow
that simply because the list is not exclusive, it also lacks some unifying
principle more concrete than significance. In the Bragdon dissentJus-
tice Rehnquist found just such a principle, adopting a version of the
Zatarain court's "frequency test."451 ForJustice Rehnquist, each of the
activities on the list-"caring for one's self, performing manual tasks,
walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning and work-
ing"452-are "repetitively performed and essential in the day-to-day
existence of a normally functioning individual."453 This test proves
much more workable than the majority's "importance" test, which
Todd Lebowitz refers to as a "momentous event" standard.454 He
447 See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 639 (1998) ("As the use of the term 'such as'
confirms, the list is illustrative, not exhaustive.").
448 See supra Part V.A.4.
449 Interpretive Guidance on Tide I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R.
pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(i), at 347 (1998).
450 See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 638.
451 See ia at 660 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); supra Part
llI.B.
452 28 C.F.R § 36.104(2) (1998); see also 29 C.F.R § 1630.2(i) (1998).
453 Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 660 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
454 Lebowitz, supra note 252, at 750. Lebowitz explains why reproduction does not
qualify as a major life activity under his variation of Rehnquist's test (the Frequency-Univer-
sality Test). For example, reproduction is not performed with macrofrequency because
"[a]bsent a multiple birth, a person simply cannot reproduce on more than one or two
occasions per year," nor by extension is it performed with "microfrequency." Id. at 745,
Reproduction also fals the universality component of Lebowitz's test for several reasons.
First, reproduction is volitional-" [u]nlike the other previously recognized major life activ-
ities [in the DOJ and EEOC lists], many people capable of reproducing simply choose not
to reproduce." Id. at 746. Further, not every "average person in the general population
can reproduce with little or no difficulty; many people are too young to reproduce, and
many woman are too old." Id. at 747. Thus, reproduction cannot meet the EEOC test of
major life activities. According to Lebowitz, "'major life activities' are those basic activities
that the average person in the general population can perform with little or no difficulty."
Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(i), at 347 (1998)). Finally, Lebowitz accounts
nicely for the reproductive differences between men and women:
Sperm production and ovulation fail the universality component of the test
because all of these reproductive functions are unique to either males or
females. Not one of the sixteen previously recognized major life activities
[is] unique to one sex; on the contrary, every previously recognized major
life activity is performed by everyone, or nearly everyone, regardless of sex.
It makes no sense to consider something a major life activity if half the
population, or more, is precluded from ever performing it.
Id. at 748 (footnotes omitted).
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notes that " [n] ot only is momentousness a criterion inconsistent with
every major life activity previously recognized by Congress or the
EEOC, it is also hopelessly vague as a standard to apply to specific
activities."45
5
Applying Rehnquist's "common thread" analysis and a dose of re-
strained textualism, each of the major life activities listed by the DOJ
and EEOC activities can be distinguished from reproduction. For in-
stance, one who cannot care for himself or herself is by definition
dependent on another for survival. Similarly, one who cannot "per-
form manual tasks" is greatly limited in his ability to work (what job,
even the most intellectually oriented, does not require the perform-
ance of a substantial number of everyday manual tasks?) and thus to
support himself. The inability to walk, see, hear, or breathe so limits
an individual's basic daily functioning that some sort of costly assist-
ance, whether it be a wheelchair, seeing-eye dog, hearing aid or respi-
rator, is required to approximate normal functioning. Yet, present
technology cannot restore these functions fully. Indeed, the inability
to breathe is almost a euphemism for death.
An individual who cannot reproduce suffers in a much different
way. An impairment of the reproductive system usually does not re-
quire the constant care of another, nor does it necessitate some sort of
expensive device to aid in the most basic acts such as navigation,
movement, and various sense perceptions. The reproductively im-
paired do not face death because of their limited ability, although the
actual cause of the impairment such as cancer or HIV might be fatal.
Finally, such an impairment does not effectively shut one off from so-
ciety by limiting the ability to communicate with others. It seems that
the primary consequence of a reproductive impairment like infertility
or HIV, aside from the obvious physical consequences, comes in the
form of the disappointment, shattered dreams, embarrassment, and
hopelessness that must surely flow from discovering that one cannot
enjoy the pleasures of fathering or bearing his or her own child. An
infertile woman may further suffer in that she is "precluded from per-
forming the major life functions commonly assigned to women" and
thus violently disassociated from her cultural identity as a nurturer.456
455 Id. at 750-51.
456 Anita Silvers, Reprising Women's Disability: Feminist Identity Strategy and Disability
Rights, 13 BERKELEY WOMEN'S LJ. 81, 86 (1998). Silvers argues that feminist theory is guilty
of marginalizing disabled women just as much as the patriarchal society in which we live.
See id. at 81. Cultural feminism, in particular, emphasizes the unique importance for wo-
men of human connection, caring, and relationships. See id. at 85-86. In light of these
gender-specific qualities, it is understandable that an infertile woman might feel great emo-
tional distress at being cut off from "the roles customary for [her] gender by being identi-
fied as disabled." Id. at 92. In fact, Silvers cites a study showing that the low sociocultural
participation rate of disabled women stems from the fact that society traditionally views
women as nurturers. See id. at 90. When they can no longer nurture, disabled women lose
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Of course, I do not intend to trivialize the experience or presume to
possess any understanding of what an infertile woman feels.457 But at
the same time, qualifying reproduction as a major life activity such
that any substantial impairment thereof constitutes a disability ex-
tends the ADA's protection to cover emotional, personalized pain.
The law cannot be the guarantor of personal happiness. Indeed, the
law consists of commands laid down to order relationships among citi-
zens,458 not the relationship between an individual and his or her
emotional suffering, at least when that pain is not inflicted by another
member of society.4 59 Would we want to qualify the short, slow, and
unathletic as disabled because they cannot participate in the varsity
collegiate sport of their choice? Surely the pressure to achieve ath-
letic success is as culturally ingrained in men as the role of the nur-
turer is in women. Or, how about the individual slighted in love,
abandoned at the altar by his betrothed? Is this person disabled in the
major life activity of marriage? Certainly marriage is no less "signifi-
cant" a part of life, to use the Supreme Court's term, than
their cultural identity and assume the role of dependents who themselves require nurtur-
ing. See id.; cf John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnany,
and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REV. 405, 409 (1983) ("IT]ihe biological experience of bearing and
giving birth is so important for women that it should be recognized as an independent
exercise of procreative freedom.").
457 Deborah Y. Dallmann describes the devastating effects of infertility on couples.
See Dallmann, supra note 213, who states:
[F] or an infertile couple desiring to have children, [infertility] 'exacts a
terrible emotional and physical toll.' Infertility causes feelings of envy as
the couple watches others with small children. Often, feelings of frustra-
tion and lack of control envelop an infertile couple as the desire to have
children becomes all-consuming.
Id. at 386 (citations omitted).
458 See BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 884 (6th ed. 1990) (stating that law is "[t]hat which
must be obeyed and followed by citizens subject to sanctions or legal consequences."). The
word "citizen" implies relationships among members of a society which encompass the
duties that they owe one another in return for the rights of citizenship. See WEBSTER'S
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 412 (Philip
Babcock Grove ed., 1993) (defining citizenship as "the quality of an individual's adjust-
ment, responsibility, or contribution to his community").
459 Various tort causes of action, such as intentional infliction of emotional distress,
represent attempts by the state to correct for the distress sustained by plaintiffs as a result
of intentional conduct "so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go
beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intoler-
able in a civilized community." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965),
quoted in STEVEN L. WILLBORN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW 173 (2d ed. 1998). Note that the
Restatement requires a certain thickness of skin as a human in our society. See id. ("The
rough edges of our society are still in need of a good deal of filing down, and in the
meantime plaintiffs must necessarily be expected and required to be hardened to a certain
amount of rough language."). Transferring, to the extent possible, these common law
notions of tort into the federal statutory context, one can argue that the infertile woman is
an example of the unfortunate victim of expected hardships for whom the law simply re-
fuses to provide a remedy.
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"[r] eproduction and the sexual dynamics surrounding it."46° A "fre-
quency/necessary for daily survival" test for major life activities will
avoid such endlessly absurd results and discourage claims like Mrs.
Abbott's, which, as the Bragdon dissent implies, seize on the reproduc-
tion loophole to get their foot in the court's door.461
Challengers to removal of reproduction from the list of major life
activities will likely make what the Zatarain court referred to as the
"bootstrap[ping]" argument 462 Following this argument, reproduc-
tion must necessarily be a major life activity because both the DOJ and
EEOC regulations list the "reproductive" system as a body system that
can be physically impaired under the ADA.463 Otherwise, including
the reproductive system on the list of possibly impaired systems would
prove meaningless. 464 However, as the dissent in Bragdon and other
commentators have pointed out, various disorders of the reproductive
system, such as dysmenorrhea, endometriosis, and cancer, may be so
painful that they limit women in major life activities such as walking
460 Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 638 (1998). For other examples of the bizarre
results achieved in reliance on Bragdon, consider the following recent decisions: McAlindin
v. County of San Diego, No. 97-56787, 1999 WL 717728, at *1, *4-*5 (9th Cir. Sept. 16, 1999)
(finding a triable issue of fact as to whether plaintiff's impotence caused by anxiety disor-
ders substantially limited his major life activity of "engaging in sexual relations"); Quick v.
Tripp, Scott, Conklin & Smith, 43 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1367-68 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (holding that
the Hepatitis-C virus substantially limited a woman in the major life activity of reproduction
because the risk of transmitting the virus from mother to fetus forced her to forgo having
any more children); Cornman v. N.P. Dodge Management Co., 43 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1072 (D.
Minn. 1999) (finding that the question of whether plaintiff's breast cancer was a disability
under the ADA constitutes a genuine issue of material fact because "society clearly consid-
ers a woman's breasts to be an integral part of her sexuality, the loss of which would neces-
sarily involve some significant impact on her sexual self-image"); and Berk v. Bates
Advertising USA, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 265, 268-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding that plaintiff's
cancer substantially limited her major life activity of reproduction by making pregnancy
extremely risky for plaintiff and requiring surgical procedures which rendered reproduc-
tion impossible).
461 See id. at 659 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The
dissent notes:
It is further telling that in the course of her entire brief to this Court, re-
spondent studiously avoids asserting even once that reproduction is a major
life activity to her. To the contrary, she argues that the 'major life activity'
inquiry should not tmrn on a particularized assessment of the circumstances
of this or any other case.
Id. Mrs. Abbott's insistence that the Court bypass the traditional individualized approach to
disability determinations would appear to betray the insincerity of her claim that HIV in-
fection substantially limits her in the major life activity of reproduction. In fact, the dissent
points out that Mrs. Abbott answered "no" when questioned at her deposition as to
whether HIV infection impaired any of her life functions. See id. Reading the ADA to allow
such frivolous claims compromises its ability to efficiently target actual instances of HIV-
based discrimination.
462 Zatarain v. WDSU-Television, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 240, 243 (E.D. La. 1995), affd, 79
F.3d 1143 (5th Cir. 1996).
463 See 28 C.F.R. § 36.104(1) (i) (1998); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (1) (1998).
464 See Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 916 F. Supp. 797, 802 (N.D. 111. 1996).
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and working.465 Thus, impairments of the reproductive system can
substantially limit activities other than reproduction. As argued ear-
lier, what the "bootstrapping" criticism really does is emphasize the
three-part nature of the ADA's disability inquiry.466 An individual
must satisfy each element of section 12102(2) (A) to qualify as dis-
abled. A per se rule that all HIV-infected individuals are substantially
limited in the major life activity of reproduction effectively eliminates
the individualized inquiry required by the statute.
Of course, this rejection of reproduction as a major life activity
does not imply that HIV infection does not substantially limit repro-
duction. Indeed, the majority in Bragdon quite correctly concluded
that it is not for the courts to ascribe a legal value to the estimated
eight percent risk of "transmitting a dread and fatal disease to one's
child."467 Although outside the scope of this Note, a substantial body
of literature exists that examines the proposition that HIV-positive wo-
men should be counseled or perhaps even prohibited from having
children due to the horrible medical and ethical consequences of per-
inatal HIV transmission. 468 Consequently, the callous argument that
"[a] ny limitation comes not from the physical impairment itself, but
from the individual's reaction to the disease"469 goes too far. This
argument essentially repeats Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Bragdon,
which emphasizes that the HIV-infected woman's voluntary decision
not to bear children-her reaction to HIV-impairs the reproductive
system, not HIV itself.470 It is needlessly unsympathetic to say that an
465 See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 660; Schneider, supra note 235, at 220. Schneider recaps
the Bragdon dissent and lists some other impairments of the reproductive system that might
be so painful as to substantially limit the major life activity of working, including "cystic-
ovarian disease, uterine tumors, and pelvic inflammatory disease." 1d. (relying on a 1997
telephone interview with a physician's assistant employed by a clinic for sexually transmit-
ted diseases).
466 See supra Part ILI.B.
467 Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 641.
468 See, e.g., John D. Arras, AIDS and Reproductive Decisions: Having Children in Fear and
Trembling, 68 MILBANK Q. 353 (1990); Suzanne Sangree, Control of Childbearing by HlV-Posi-
tive Women: Some Responses to Emerging Legal Policies, 41 BuFF. L. REV. 309 (1993); Joelle S.
Weiss, Comment, Controlling HlV-Positive Women's Procreative Destiny: A Critical Equal Protec-
tion Analysis, 2 SLroN HALL CONST. LJ. 643, 644-60 (1992).
469 Schneider, supra note 235, at 210.
470 See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 660-61 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). Rehnquist wrote:
The record before us leaves no doubt that those so infected [with HIV] are
still entirely able to engage in sexual intercourse [or] give birth to a child if
they become pregnant.. . . While individuals infected with HIV may
choose not to engage in these activities, there is no support in language,
logic, or our case law for the proposition that such voluntary choices consti-
tute a "limit" on one's own life activities.
Id. (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Schneider, supra
note 235, at 225 ("There is nothing about the infection itself which substantially limits
reproductive activity.").
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HIV-infected woman has any real choice as to whether or not to have
children.
Commentators also rely on the Runnebaum court's citation to a
portion of the Kmiec memorandum that states that "'nothing inher-
ent in the infection ... actually prevents either procreation or inti-
mate relations.'' 71 But these scholars pervert this language by taking
it out of context. While the Kmiec memorandum admits that HIV
specifically impairs an asymptomatic individual's decision to engage in
the major life activity of reproduction rather than the actual act, the
memorandum does so while arguing that, such precision aside, this
sort of drastic alteration of a behavioral choice-whether or not to
bear children-should nonetheless qualify as disabling.472 Accord-
ingly, the assertion that if Congress wanted to cover the reaction of
HIV-positive individuals to their disease it would have expressly done
so in the statute4 73 seems somewhat simplistic.
This Note has already explored the immense ambiguity inherent
in the ADA's definition of disability, which does not begin to account
for all of the legislative history discussed above. Under step two of
Chevron,474 a DOJ regulation stating that the ADA covers HIV-infected
individuals because they are substantially limited in the major life ac-
tivity of reproduction could indeed capitalize on this ambiguity, and
yet the courts may deem it arbitrary and capricious. However, this
Note seeks to find a coherent rationale for covering HIV as a disabil-
ity, not a technical argument on which it can rely.
Completely ignoring the reaction of HIV-infected women to their
infection-their decision not to bear children-is dearly unrealistic.
At the same time, however, we can use the rationale that HIV infec-
tion does not prevent production to illustrate the basic characteristic
of reproduction which clearly warrants its removal from the list of ma-
jor life activities. That Mrs. Abbott could choose not to have children
stands as proof that she could live day-to-day without reproducing.
The voluntary nature of the reproductive act, while it does not lessen
the effects of HIV infection on the reproductive system, at least rele-
gates reproduction to the status of an important life activity that we
can reasonably expect certain unlucky individuals to forgo. 475
471 Schneider, supra note 235, at 222 (quoting Kmiec Memorandum, supra note 90, at
405:4-7).
472 See Kmiec Memorandum, supra note 90, at 405:6-7.
473 See Schneider, supra note 235, at 223.
474 See supra Part V.A.4.a.
475 In fact, the infertile or HIV-positive woman need not totally forgo the joys of moth-
erhood. Adoption may remain a viable option for many, although this option prompts the
question of whether adoption agencies will allow HIV-positive women to adopt.
2571999]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
b. Failure to Include Reproduction as a Major Life Activity Does
Not Violate the Fundamental Right to Reproductive
Privacy
Several cases holding that HIV is a disability because it substan-
dally limits the major life activity of reproduction generally refer to
the idea that the entire act of procreation is a fundamental privacy
right.4 76 The infertility cases also rely on this vague notion of repro-
duction as a special, protected act, albeit with more stirring rhetoric:
In essence, Zatarain and Krauel trivialize reproduction. At the risk
of waxing philosophical, none of us, nor any living thing, would ex-
ist without reproduction. Many, if not most, people would consider
having a child to be one of life's most significant moments and
greatest achievements, and the inability to do so, one of life's great-
est disappointments. Since time immemorial, people have procre-
ated, not as a lifestyle choice, but as an integral part of life.4 77
These assertions, however, implicitly rest on the mistaken belief that
the Supreme Court's reproductive autonomy cases directly address re-
strictions on the ability to reproduce.47 Instead, this line of cases
takes a passive stance regarding reproduction in that the Supreme
Court guarantees individuals only a right to certain freedom from
state intrusions into such personal decisions as birth control, when to
have children, and when to have an abortion.479 The Supreme Court
has never expanded the privacy right to include an affirmative entitle-
ment, in the form of protection from discrimination, to state or fed-
eral compensation for the inability to reproduce.
476 See, e.g., Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 638 (1998) ("Reproduction falls well
within the phrase 'major life activity.' Reproduction and the sexual dynamics surrounding
it are central to the life process itself."); Anderson v. Gus Mayer Boston Store, 924 F. Supp.
763, 777 n.37 (E.D. Tex. 1996) (noting that HIV is an "obvious impairment on the ability
to procreate"); Cain v. Hyatt, 734 F. Supp. 671, 679 (E.D. Pa. 1990) ("There is no gainsay-
ing that this significant injury to the reproductive system impedes a major life activity.").
477 Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 916 F. Supp. 797, 804 (N.D. IMl. 1996); see also, e.g.,
Soodman v. Wildman, Harrold, Allen & Dixon, No. 95-C3834, 1997 WL 106257, at *5 (N.D.
Ill. Feb. 10, 1997). The Soodman court noted:
While people typically perform other life activities (e.g., walking, breathing,
learning or working) more often than they attempt to have children, child
bearing remains a significant and basic aspect of life. To find it to be some-
thing less than a major life activity would reduce it to nothing more than a
lifestyle choice. Such a narrow interpretation would be inconsistent with
the importance Congress has elsewhere afforded pregnancy and
childbearing.
Id. (citation omitted); see also Erickson v. Board of Governors, 911 F. Supp. 316, 322 (N.D.
Il1. 1995) ("The Court disagrees with this reasoning [in Zatarain], which appears to view
reproduction as the act of conception only, thus ignoring the processes that occur continu-
ally in both male and female reproductive systems in order to achieve conception."); see
also supra Part IIIA.
478 See Robertson, supra note 456, at 414-20.
479 See id.
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The privacy cases consist of two distinct but related lines, one
dealing with access to contraceptives and the other with the right to
an abortion. Skinner v. Oklahoma4 80 provides the point of departure
for both. Here, the Court invalidated on equal protection grounds an
Oklahoma statute providing for compulsory sterilization of individuals
convicted three times of felonies showing "moral turpitude," but not
of those convicted of white-collar crimes.4 8' Yet the real impetus for
the Court's strict scrutiny of the statute actually rested on the statute's
interference in the realm of marriage and procreation.48 2 In the
founding decision of the Court's contraceptive line of cases, Griswold
v. Connecticut,48 3 Justice Douglas relied in part on Skinner and its em-
phasis on a zone of privacy to create his famous penumbral rights of
privacy surrounding the Bill of Rights. 48 4 In Griswold, the Court over-
turned a Connecticut statute which forbade both the use of contra-
ceptives and the aiding or counseling of others in their use,485 finding
the statute "repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the mar-
riage relationship."4 6 Later contraception cases held unconstitu-
tional similar state intrusions into reproductive privacy, gradually
expanding the scope of that privacy beyond the marriage relationship
to include the reproductive decisions of single persons48 7 and
minors.48 8
The abortion line of cases, while affirming the protected status of
reproductive decisions established by the contraception line,48 9 never-
theless asserts that the right to be free from governmental incursions
into the reproductive sphere is not absolute. In Roe v. Wade,490 for
example, the Court held that although the privacy right "is broad
480 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
481 Id at 536-37.
482 See id. at 541 ("We are dealing here with legislation which involves one of the basic
civil rights of man. Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and
survival of the race." (emphasis added)).
483 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
484 See id. at 485 ("These cases [including Skinner] bear witness that the right of privacy
which presses for recognition here is a legitimate one.").
485 See id, at 481.
486 Id. at 486.
487 See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-55 (1972) (overturning, on equal protec-
tion grounds, a Massachusetts statute prohibiting distribution of contraceptives to married
persons because "[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individua4
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child").
488 See Carey v. Population Servs., Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 687 (1977) (finding unconstitu-
tional a New York statute prohibiting the sale or distribution of contraceptives to anyone
under sixteen because "the teaching of Griswold is that the Constitution protects individual
decisions in matters of childbearing from unjustified intrusion by the State").
489 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) (citing among others the Skinner,
Griswol, and Eisenstadt cases as authority for the existence of "certain areas or zones of
privacy" under the Constitution).
490 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate
her pregnancy," it is "not unqualified" and may be outweighed by a
compelling state interest (i.e., preserving the life of the fetus after the
first trimester).491
If the Supreme Court permits state inference with reproductive
decisions covered by the general privacy right, one cannot possibly
argue that the state must insure each citizen against the loss of the
ability to procreate effectively. Nonetheless, this is just the argument
that proponents of reproduction as a major life activity, such as
Deborah Y. Dallmann, make: "Although none of these... [contracep-
tion and abortion] cases specifically address the right of infertile
couples to reproduce, at bottom they embrace one undeniable princi-
ple: reproduction is a fundamental human right."492 For Dallmann, if
reproduction is a fundamental right, it must be a major life activity,
and consequently it can serve as the basis for qualifying infertility as a
disability under the ADA. 493 But as previously discussed,494 labeling
infertility as disabling entitles an infertile or HIV-infected woman to
protection under the ADA and thus to federal compensation 495 for
the emotional pain of what is surely a devastating occurrence, but
most assuredly not an activity necessary to an individual's survival. Ac-
cordingly, failure to qualify reproduction as a major life activity does
not violate the fundamental right to procreative autonomy because no
federal imposition on that right is involved. Rather, this failure dem-
onstrates a reluctance to interfere at all.
c. Failure to Include Reproduction as a Major Life Activity Does
Not Violate the Fundamental Right to Raise and Educate
One's Children
Also encompassed within the general privacy right is the right to
raise and educate one's children, first set out by the Supreme Court in
491 Id. at 153-54, 163; cf Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (af-
firming the essential holding of Roe, but on a liberty interest rather than a privacy right
basis, and noting that "[o]ur law affords constitutional protection to personal decisions
relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and
education"). But see Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (finding the belief of
the Georgia electorate that homosexual sodomy is immoral sufficient to uphold Georgia's
and-sodomy statute). The Hardwick Court noted that "[tihere should be ... great resist-
ance to expand the substantive reach of [the Due Process] Clauses, particularly if it re-
quires redefining the category of rights deemed to be fundamental." Id at 195.
492 Dallmann, supra note 213, at 413.
493 See id.
494 See supra Part V.B.I.a.
495 This compensation might come in the form of an order requiring the discrimina-
tor to accommodate the reproductively impaired individual under Title I1 of the ADA.
Although the cost of ajudgment under Title 11 may well full on the discriminator, the state
will still have to bear the expense of presiding over the litigation.
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Pierce v. Society of Sisters.49 6 In Pierce, the Court enjoined enforcement
of Oregon's Compulsory Education Act of 1922, which required chil-
dren to attend public school, thus prohibiting attendance at private
and parochial schools. 497 The Court explained that the statute "un-
reasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to di-
rect the upbringing and education of children under their
control."498 Similarly, some fifty years later in Stanley v. Illinois,4 99 the
Court stressed that "[tihe rights to conceive and to raise one's chil-
dren have been deemed 'essential,"' 50 0 due process rights. In that
case, the Court invalidated a state law that denied a hearing to an
unwed father as to his parental fitness, before his children could be
taken from him in a dependency proceeding.50 '
Daflmann refers to this constitutional right to raise one's children
as further support for her claim that reproduction is a major life activ-
ity under the ADA.50 2 But her claim fails to make the important dis-
tinction between reproduction, which encompasses the processes
leading up to and including birth, if we accept Justice Rehnquist's
construction of the term,505 and child rearing, which refers to the
post-birth period.50 4 For an infertile or HIV-infected woman, her de-
gree of autonomy after birth is irrelevant because birth is either ex-
tremely dangerous or not an option at all. Thus, removal of
reproduction from the regulatory list of major life activities does not
implicate the constitutional right to raise one's children.
2. State and Federal Governments Are Not Required to Enable People
to Avail Themselves of Constitutionally-Protected Choices
If the reproductive privacy and child bearing cases establish a
ceiling beyond which state intervention in the private sphere may not
proceed absent a compelling state interest, then three companion
496 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
497 See id. at 530-31.
498 Id. at 534-35.
499 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
500 Id. at 651 (citations omitted); cf Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 445-46
(1990) ("Parents have an interest in controlling the education and upbringing of their
children .... [and] [tihe family has a privacy interest in the upbringing and education of
children... which is protected by the Constitution against undue state interference.").
501 See Stanley, 405 U.S. at 658.
502 See Dallmann, supra note 213, at 411 (citingJustice Kennedy's statement in Hodgson
that the right to conceive and raise one's children is "far more precious... than property
rights" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
503 See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 658 n.2 (1998) (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
504 See Robertson, supra note 456, at 415 ("Yet a closer look reveals that except for
Skinner v. Oklahoma... none of the Court's cases asserting a right to procreate, directly
address restrictions on reproduction .... Instead, they assume the children's existence
and assert the parents' right to autonomy in rearing them." (footnotes omitted)).
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cases, Maher v. Roe,50 5 Poelker v. Doe,50 6 and Beal v. Doe,50 7 each holding
that "neither the Constitution nor federal law required states to fund
nontherapeutic abortions for women with financial need,"508 similarly
define the limitations of government in assuring that all individuals
are presented with the same basket of choices and opportunities in
life. Consistent with these three cases, the Court's ruling in Harris v.
McRae50 9 proves especially interesting for the more general proposi-
tion that "the due process clause does not require states to provide
funds to enable people to avail themselves of constitutionally-pro-
tected choices."5 10 The Court stated that even though "government
may not place obstacles in the path of a woman's exercise of her free-
dom of choice, it need not remove those not of its own creation."5 11
Therefore, although Roe v. Wade had established a limited constitu-
tional right to have an abortion, Harris effectively held that the state
did not have to provide the financing to realize that right as long as it
did not affirmatively interfere to compromise the right.
Extending Harris to the case of HIV-infected or infertile women
alleging that their impairment substantially limits the major life activ-
ity of reproduction illustrates that the ADA would not violate a consti-
tutional right by refusing to recognize such a claim. Clearly, by
denying this claim under the ADA, the federal government would not
be creating any additional obstacles to these women's exercise of their
freedom of reproductive choice. The obstacle-HIV or infertility-is
already in place. Denial of discrimination protection and the poten-
tial damages that might accompany a successful suit does not restrict
the basic reproductive choice of the allegedly disabled HIV-positive
woman: whether or not to have children. For the infertile woman, no
real choice exists, but again, the government did not impose the infer-
tility on her in the first place. Perhaps a federal statute prohibiting
HIV-positive women from having children 5 12 would unduly limit re-
productive autonomy under Harris, but we can easily imagine a suffi-
505 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (holding that Connecticut's refusal to pay for nontherapeutic
abortions for indigent women did not violate the Equal Protection Clause).
506 432 U.S. 519 (1977) (per curiam) (rejecting an attack on the decision of municipal
hospitals in St. Louis to subsidize childbirth services, but not nontherapeutic abortion
services).
507 432 U.S. 438 (1977) (holding that a state participating in the Medicaid program
was not required by Title XIX of the Social Security Act to fund the cost of nontherapeutic
abortions).
508 ARFuN Er A., supra note 425, at 1280.
509 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (finding that the 1976 Hyde Amendment which prohibited
Medicaid reimbursement for most medically necessary abortions, did not unduly restrict a
woman's right to an abortion).
510 AREEN ET AL., supra note 425, at 1281.
511 Harris, 448 U.S. at 316.
512 See supra note 468 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 85:189
IMPLICATIONS FOR HIV INFECTION
ciently compelling state interest, such as protecting newborns from
contracting HIV, that would justify this imposition.
Ultimately, then, rejecting reproduction as a major life activity
under the ADA avoids any constitutional pitfalls while closing a loop-
hole through which normally functioning individuals can achieve disa-
bility status.
C. Alternative Standard: ADA Coverage of HIV Infection Should
Be Based on an Individualized, Case-by-Case Analysis
The three-stage progression of HIV presented at the beginning of
this Note513 offers possibly the most obvious answer to the tension be-
tween Congress's apparent desire for a per se rule that applies to HIV-
infected individuals51 4 and the equally clear fact that a certain class of
HIV-infected individuals-the asymptomatic, if not yet targets of HIV-
based discrimination-do not need a per se rule. During the initial
stage of HIV, which precedes the asymptomatic phase, the virus con-
centrates in the blood and immediately assaults the immune sys-
tem.515 The horrible consequences of AIDS (symptomatic HIV)-
muscle pain, oral lesions, bacterial infections, Kaposi's sarcoma, non-
Hodgkins lymphoma 516-all follow from this single invasion of the im-
mune system. In the asymptomatic stage, some minor symptoms per-
sist, but the virus essentially lies dormant in the lymph nodes.51 7
A sliding-scale construction of the disease thus suggests itself.
The asymptomatic, while incontestably infected with a potentially disa-
bling disease of the immune system, do not presently suffer from such
a disabled immune system that they cannot proceed with their every-
day lives. 518 Once an infected individual reaches the symptomatic
stage and the appurtenant symptoms manifest themselves to a disa-
bling extent,519 we could say that the individual is substantially limited
in the major life activity of fighting off infections that the non-HIV-
infected individual could normally withstand. It thus follows that
fighting infection falls within the EEOC Compliance Manual defini-
tion of major life activities: "[T]hose basic activities that the average
person in the general population can perform with little or no diffi-
513 See supra note 12.
514 See supra Part H.A.l.
515 See supra note 12.
516 See id.
517 See id
518 Recall that in her deposition, Mrs. Abbott answered "no" to the question of
whether she was limited in the ability to perform any of her life functions. See Bragdon v.
Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 659 (1998) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
519 See supra note 12.
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culty."5 20 Of course, different individuals may become symptomatic at
different points during their lives after contracting HIV, if at all, and
may exhibit symptoms of full-blown AIDS to varying degrees. Recog-
nizing this lack of uniformity argues for a return to the case-by-case
analysis implicit in the words "of such individual" in section
12102(2) (A) of the ADA, which the Fourth Circuit 521 as well as the
DOJ and EEOC interpretive guidelines recommend.522
1. Dangers of a Per Se Disability Rule
The ADA has received substantial criticism for producing absurd
results.525 As noted above, covering HIV-infected individuals under
the ADA via the substantial limitation imposed by HIV infection on
reproduction might actually achieve results contrary to Congress's in-
tent to provide protection for both asymptomatic and symptomatic
individuals by excluding those unable to allege a substantial impair-
ment of their reproductive abilities.524
This Note has already discussed some of the hypothetical costs of
covering asymptomatic individuals under a per se rule before they be-
come subject to discriminatory treatment.525 Additionally, it has con-
sidered how tying ADA coverage of HIV-positive individuals to
reproduction fails to punish the discriminatory attitudes clearly
targeted by the statute.526 But consider the potential consequences of
a rule that HIV is per se disabling. For example, we might wonder
whether asymptomatic HIV-positive individuals truly desire the protec-
tions offered by the ADA at the price of being labeled as disabled.
Indeed, it has been noted that "[t]he perception that people with dis-
abilities are distinctively different and 'special' is closely associated
with attitudes of patronization and pity that most individuals with disa-
bilities decry."527
In the recent right-to-die case, Vacco v. Qui4528 two national orga-
nizations of disabled persons submitted amicus briefs arguing that as-
520 EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) 6883, § 902.3 (1995).
521 See supra Part II.C.
522 See Preamble to Regulation on Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability by Pub-
lic Accommodations and in Commercial Facilities, 28 C.F.R pt. 36 app. B § 36.104, at 583
(1998); Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R
pt. 1630 app. §1630.2(j), at 347 (1998).
523 See, e.g., James Bovard, The Disabilities Act's Parade of Absurdities, WALL ST. J.,June 22,
1995, at A16. But see Gilbert F. Casellas, EEOC Chairman, Editorial, Forget the Sympathy;
We're Talking Justice WAL. ST. J., July 14, 1995, at A13 (replying to the Bovard piece).
524 See supra Part V.B.
525 See supra Part V.
526 See supra Part III.B.
527 Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., "Substantially Limited"Protection from Disability Discrimination:
The Special Treatment Model and Misconstructions of the Definition of Disabiliy, 42 ViLL. L. REV.
409, 525 (1997).
528 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
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sisted suicide constitutes "the most lethal form" of discrimination
against the disabled.529 In so doing, these groups rejected as discrimi-
natory treatment a procedure which many argued offered terminally
ill patients suffering unendurable pain the same honorable, painless
death available to most people. The Not DeadYet brief further argues
that assisted suicide devalues people with disabilities by essentially tell-
ing them that their disabled lives are not worth living. 530 Thus, for
Not Dead Yet, an attempt to equalize the disabled through the vehicle
of assisted suicide actually constitutes discriminatory treatment.
Although clearly a less extreme example, creating a per se disabil-
ity rule regarding HIV infection could arguably have a similar effect by
sending a message to the asymptomatic that they are really incapable
individuals, something less than "normal citizens," and thus the
proper beneficiaries of the federal government's altruism. Similarly,
Anita Silvers notes that:
[I] t is misleading to take one person with a disability as speaking for
others, or to presume that to adjust an environment for one will
facilitate most others.... To be disabled is, fundamentally, to be
unique in one's mode(s) of performance. To be so makes one ex-
ceptionally vulnerable to, and unduly limited by policies, practices,
and environments designed to be applied uniformly on the basis of
what is common to a class.531
Extrapolate this statement to the entire HIV-positive population. We
might then say that it is dangerous to take the unifying characteristic
of all symptomatic and asymptomatic HIV-positive individuals-an im-
pairment of the immune system-and then apply a disability rule uni-
formly to these two groups when, in fact, one group is significantly less
limited in its "modes of performance" than the other. Silver's ap-
proach suggests that some value exists for disabled individuals to view
their disability as the normal state of affairs in their micro-
environment 53 2
Consequently, the primary lesson to be taken from these hy-
potheticals is that we might want to consider the advantages of fash-
ioning an antidisability discrimination statute that accounts for the
differences in the HIV-positive population rather than masking them
over at the risk of some degree of overbreadth. This goal can be
achieved by making determinations of disability for the asymptomatic
on a case-by-case basis.
529 Amici Curiae Brief of Not Dead Yet and American Disabled for Attendant Pro-
grams Today in Support of Petitioners at 2, Vacco (No. 95-1858).
530 See id. at 8.
531 Silvers, supra note 456, at 103.
532 See idi at 105 ("[W]e find that the main ingredient of being (perceived as) normal
lies in being in an environment arranged to suit one's self.").
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2. Asymptomatic HIV "Regarded as" Element
Having rejected reproduction as the proper means for covering
asymptomatic individuals under the ADA, several scholars propose
that when the asymptomatic suffer from discrimination, the "regarded
as" prong of the ADA's definition of disability should kick in to pro-
vide protection against society's misperceptions about HIV infec-
tion. 33 These suggestions offer nothing new to the HIV-as-disability
analysis. As far back as 1988, the Kmiec memo argued that the Reha-
bilitation Act may protect asymptomatic HIV-infected individuals via
its "regarded as" prong.534 And, as discussed in Parts ll.A.3 and II.B,
both the pre- and post-ADA cases dealing with asymptomatic HIV as a
disability all involved instances of discrimination based on unfounded
fears as to the victim's ability to perform in the workplace, interact
with others, and so on. Consequently, the "regarded as" prong proves
well-tailored to remain dormant when protection is not needed, and
yet rise to the occasion when discrimination appears. Furthermore, in
keeping with the notion that we may not want a disability statute to
devalue its beneficiaries, the "regarded as" prong assumes that the
fault lies with the discriminator.5 5
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Runnebaum v. NationsBank of
Maryland, N.A. 58 6 clearly goes to extremes in holding that asymptom-
atic HIV infection does not constitute an impairment under the ADA
simply because it creates "no diminishing effects on the individual." 537
This ruling baldly ignores the medical evidence compiled above,
which states that during the asymptomatic stage, the virus migrates to
the lymph nodes and certain symptoms such as "dermatological disor-
ders, oral lesions, and bacterial infections," may persist.538 In this re-
gard, the term "asymptomatic" is something of a misnomer, and
consequently, the majority in Bragdon held it to be an impairment.5 9
To conclude otherwise would violate the. clear and reasonable inter-
583 See, e.g., Lazzarini, supra note 443, at 18; Chambers, supra note 19, at 427; Schnei-
der, supra note 235, at 226-27.
534 See Kmiec Memorandum, supra note 90, at 405:1-2 ("[S]ection 504 protects sympto-
matic and asymptomatic HIV-infected individuals against discrimination in any covered
program or activity on the basis of any actual, past, or perceived effect of HIV infection that
substantially limits any major life activity so long as the HIV-individual is 'otherwise quali-
fied' to participate in the program or activity. . . ."); Johnsen Memorandum, supra note
102.
535 See 28 C.F.R. § 36.104(4) (ii) (1998); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(1) (2) (1998) (defining "re-
garded as" as "ha[ving] a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits major life
activities only as a result of the attitudes of others toward such impairment").
536 123 F.3d 156 (4th Cir. 1997).
537 Id. at 168.
538 Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 635-37 (1998).
539 See ia at 644.
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pretation adopted by the DOJ and EEOC implementing regulations
that the "hemic and lymphatic" systems can suffer an impairment.540
The "regarded as" prong thus acknowledges what the asymptom-
atic can do. At the same time, it offers them protection when society
fails to recognize these abilities, without creating a loophole that by-
passes the requirement of actual discrimination. Mary Anne Bobinski
nicely sums up this tension between the abilities of asymptomatic indi-
viduals, the challenges they face, and the dangers of a per se rule tied
to reproduction:
During [the asymptomatic stage], people with HIV infection may
continue to work and engage in other activities, often unaware of
their HIV status. Furthermore, even casual media consumers have
heard about advances in treatments for persons with HIV infection
that apparently can help many to lead longer and healthier lives.
Magic Johnson came back, only to be retired by low ratings rather
than poor health. Advertisements for HIV-related therapies inevita-
bly picture amateur marathoners or weight lifters. Local commu-
nity centers hold workshops for persons with HIV infection on
giving up disability benefits and returning to work. These facts re-
quire a stretching and pulling of the concept of disability if it is to
be worn as a protective cloak by persons with HIV infection. What
does it mean to be "disabled" if you can run 26 miles and put in a
full day at work? On the other hand, few would doubt the contin-
ued need for protective legislation, given public fears and attitudes
toward people infected with the virus.541
3. Symptomatic HIV Substantially Limits the Major Life Activity of
Fighting Infection
The hemic and lymphatic systems offer the most logical and obvi-
ous means for covering symptomatic HIV-positive individuals under
the ADA. Indeed, this solution seems exceedingly apparent from
even a cursory reading of the list of body systems that can be impaired
under the EEOC and DOJ implementing regulations, which includes
the "hemic and lympathic" systems-the immune system.542 Further-
more, the Federal Office of Contract Compliance has defined AIDS
(symptomatic HIV) as an immune disease: "AIDS is primarily a disease
of the body's immune system, which causes the system's collapse, and
consequently, renders the afflicted individual vulnerable to many in-
fections and cancers .... AIDS is the most severe form of a progres-
540 See 28 C.F.R. § 36.104(1) (i) (1998); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (1) (1998).
541 Mary Anne Bobinski, The Expanding Domain of the ADA: The Supreme Court's Decision
in Abbott v. Bragdon, 61 TLx. B.J. 918, 921-22 (1998).
542 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (1); 28 C.F.R. § 36.104(1) (i).
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sive immunologic compromise caused by HIV." 54 3 We thus come full
circle to the conclusions of one of the first legal scholars to tackle the
HIV-AIDS epidemic, Professor Arthur Leonard. Professor Leonard ar-
gued in 1985 that "[p] ersons with AIDS would appear to be within the
'impairment' category because the ability to fight infection and pre-
serve health is logically, a 'major life function' albeit less visible than
walking, talking, or lifting."544
It simply makes sense to tie coverage for the symptomatic to the
specific impairment from which they suffer. Further, fighting off in-
fection fits in well with the illustrative list of major life activities, per-
formed frequently and on a daily basis. Foreign materials constantly
bombard the body, thus satisfying the frequency and daily require-
ments if necessary. Moreover, because an impaired immune system
can lead to death, as in the case of full-blown AIDS itself, the ability to
fight infection must necessarily be a major life activity-how could
one live without it?
Admittedly, skeptics like Justice Rehnquist may cite this rationale
as an example of "bootstrapping."545 To some extent, they would be
correct. Since symptomatic HIV infection will always be an impair-
ment of the hemic and lymphatic systems, in essence a per se rule says
that it will always substantially limit the major life activity of fighting
infection. Perhaps the judicial obsession with basing the ADA's cover-
age of HIV-infected individuals on reproduction evolved out of a de-
sire to avoid any bootstrapping and thus to preserve the three-part
disability test of section 12102 (2) (A) of the ADA. But, although per se
rules may be dangerous, in this instance at least the per se rule would
be applied to a coherent subgroup of HIV-positive individuals, not
both the asymptomatic and the symptomatic. Finally, the strict ADA
analysis need not change to accommodate a per se rule. Rather, we
can apply the three steps of section 12102(2) (A) of the ADA with
every symptomatic individual, preserving the integrity of the statute,
yet knowing all along that this is a constructive per se disability.
CONCLUSION
This framework for HIV infection as a disability, consisting of a
de facto per se rule regarding the symptomatic and a "regarded as"
test for the asymptomatic, provides a flexible framework within which
Congress's desire to "to provide a clear and comprehensive national
mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with
543 Office Fed. Contract Compliance Programs, Directive on AIDS as a Protected
Handicap (1988), reprinted in 8 Fair. EmpI. Prac. Man. (BNA) 405:351 (1995).
544 Arthur S. Leonard, Employment Discrimination Against Persons with AIDS, 10 U. DAY-
TON L. RE.v. 681, 691 (1985).
545 See supra notes 316-18 and accompanying text.
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disabilities '546 can be realized. This scheme condemns the "accumu-
lated myths and fears"547 that give rise to discrimination by basing cov-
erage for the asymptomatic on that very discrimination rather than
the technical loophole produced by the notion that reproduction is a
major life activity under the ADA. When the disability is real, as in the
case of symptomatic individuals, the per se rule provides a quick and
just remedy.
The introduction to this Note pointed out the fear voiced by
Parmet andJackson, that as society, fueled by the promise of new won-
der drugs, comes to view HIV as just another disease rather than an
epidemic, protection for the HIV-infected will disintegrate before
medicine can really handle the disease.5 48 The "regarded as"-per se
framework allays these fears by protecting those individuals whose
HIV may appear to be under control for the moment but suddenly
progresses to the next stage, either physically or in the eyes of an-
other. If an asymptomatic individual becomes symptomatic, the pro-
tection he or she enjoys is immediately ratcheted up to the
symptomatic per se standard. If an asymptomatic individual suffers
discrimination from someone like a Dr. Bragdon who misperceives
the true risks imposed by AIDS, similar protections fall into place.
Hence, the framework allows for optimism in the battle against AIDS.
As we come closer to a cure, more HIV-positive individuals will move
into the "regarded as" pool, but remain protected by the back-up per
se rule, should their status or society's perception thereof changes.
Under a "regarded as" analysis, the Supreme Court achieved a
morally admirable result in Bragdon v. Abbott, if we assume that Dr.
Bragdon's refusal to treat Mrs. Abbott in his office stemmed from
some stereotypic fears as to her contagiousness rather than sound
medical evidence of a "direct threat." But in so doing, the Court per-
petuated a tortured legal analysis, entangling itself in a puzzling zeal
for basing ADA coverage of the asymptomatic on reproduction. In
fact, the absurdity of tying coverage to reproduction proves to be of
more than an academic interest. I first heard about the Bragdon case
last summer while visiting a friend in New Hampshire. Her neighbor,
aware that we were both law students, excitedly showed us the day's
newspaper report describing the Court's decision. He simply could
not understand why the law should label Mrs. Abbott disabled just be-
cause her HIV infection impaired her ability to reproduce. At some
level, his reaction to the opinion conveyed a skepticism as to the
sincerity of Mrs. Abbott's claim. But more importantly, he instantly
recognized the Court's unfortunate reasoning. One wonders why
546 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (1994).
547 School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987).
548 See Parmet &Jackson, supra note 1, at 8-9, 28-29.
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someone with no formal legal training so quickly saw the oddity of a
reproduction-based disability standard for asymptomatic HIV patients
when the Supreme Court still cannot.
